# The New REPUBLIC

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LAST week a way out of their present difficulties still remained possible both for Germany and the United States. The opening was narrow and full of pitfalls, but with good will on both sides it could be managed. The events of the last few days have closed the opening. We have not the text of the new American note before us, but its tenor has been officially announced. The American government yields nothing and announces that another act comparable to the sinking of the Lusitania would be regarded as "unfriendly." On the other hand, evidence is accumulating that a repetition of the Lusitania offence is only a question of time. The bombardment of the Orduna practically proves that Germany is not seeking any way out except at the exclusive expense of neutral rights under maritime law. German journals published in New York as well as in Berlin boast that the submarines will continue to torpedo English vessels without notice and without compunction. When the next Lusitania is torpedoed the American government will regard it as an unfriendly act. Some kind of a break with Germany will follow. Count von Bernstorff will be handed his passports, and the American Ambassador will be withdrawn from Berlin. The two countries will be on the verge of war. But if war follows, when then? Has any sufficient consideration been given to the anomalous situation in which the United States would be placed as the result of war with Germany? How can war be conducted so as to contribute most effectively not merely to the successful establishment of the American contention as against Germany, but to the interest which the American nation as a pacific democracy has most at heart—the increasing authority and safety of intercourse among nations on the high seas? These are the questions on which the attention of American public opinion should now be fastened.

DOES the British government realize the risk involved by a still further restriction of the sale of cotton in Europe? If they do not, they are badly advised by their American representatives and friends. If they do, they are placing themselves in the extraordinary position of jeopardizing a supply of war material essential to their own success in order to keep out of Germany a comparatively unessential article. They are pursuing the one policy which may make it possible for the advocates of an embargo upon munitions of war to work up a majority in Congress. As the matter stood until recently, an embargo resolution could not have received more than a scattering vote, composed of representatives of partly German districts and a smaller number of Congressmen who want to relieve the United States of all responsibility for the endurance and the results of the war. There may now be added to this scattering vote the support of the majority of the Southern Congressmen. The South is acquiring an increasing resentment against illegal restrictions upon the sale of its all-important staple commodity. It is suffering more acutely from the business effects of the war than any other part of the country. Commerce continues prostrate throughout that whole region, because cotton cannot be sold at a profitable price. During the win-


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ter cotton experts believed that the price might recover to ten cents or over during 1915; but if such a chance existed the cutting off of exports to Germany and neutral countries has wiped it out. The South is very much attached to its own local interests. It does not consider that the bouncing trade which other parts of the country are deriving in war supplies affords any compensation for its own losses. It has very little interest in the issues of the war and no sympathetic attachment to the cause of the Allies. It will consider an embargo exclusively as a club with which to compel Great Britain to abandon her illegal suffocation of non-contraband American trade with Germany and with neutrals. The club is powerful, and the British government is unwise to afford any sufficient pretext for flourishing it.

ONE wholly inexcusable result of Democratic government in Washington has been a progressive degradation of the standards of administrative independence and competence. The work of degradation has been carried on inconspicuously and cautiously, but its advocates have been insistent, and its cumulative results have become formidable. Beginning under President McKinley a steady improvement in administrative standards was maintained under Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft. Both of these presidents earnestly tried to give to trained and experienced officials the independence of political dictation and the security of tenure necessary to the best performance of their work. But whatever they accomplished in this respect has been thrown away since March 4, 1913. President Wilson has been governing by means of his party, and except in the case of peculiarly flagrant demands he and the majority of his Cabinet have submitted to political pressure not merely in the State Department but throughout the service. Experts of long experience have been displaced and their places taken by inferior men whose only claim to recognition was that of party service. Perhaps the most flagrant case of this kind is that of the Reclamation Service. As originally organized and as operated for the first ten years, it was an expert engineering department, which spent the money derived from the sale of public lands and placed in its hands by Congress in such manner as in the opinion of competent technical opinion the expenditure would be most fruitful. All this has been changed. Since July first the money derived from the sale of public lands has been covered into the Treasury, and hereafter reclamation projects will depend for their carrying out on Congressional approval and appropriations. They will become, that is, part of the pork-barrel, and will be divided up among the districts according to the political influence of the local representatives. At the same time the Reclamation Service has been reorganized. In the place of a single director has been substituted a commission, of which the majority are neither engineers nor specialists in irrigation. Mr. F. H. Newell, the former director, has been gradually dismissed. Western political influences have finally become dominant in the policy of what was one of the most independent bureaus in the national service.

IN the case of Harry K. Thaw it looks as if the State of New York had thoroughly well got its leg pulled. The state deserved it richly, for it asked a judge and a jury to decide a question which they are simply incapable of deciding. Those laymen could no more pass on Thaw's sanity than upon the condition of his liver. Watching a paranoiac for a few days in a court room and admiring his ready memory or his smart retorts is no basis for any kind of verdict. It is in the very nature of some forms of mental disease that they do not come to the surface unless specially provoked. Thus a man may be highly educated, courteous, genial in every relation of life, and still bear within him a murderous disposition which breaks out only on special occasions. The voluble juryman who has been so much interviewed came pretty close to the truth when he said that Thaw would never kill except when a woman was involved. Considering the number of women there are in the world who require a St. George to rescue them, the juryman opened up large possibilities for the future.

WHAT freed Thaw was in reality a combination of prejudices. He behaved well in court. The state's alienists behaved badly in court. Thaw has fought a long fight, and men admire persistence. He had murdered Stanford White, a man who happened to be a genius, but whose genius was forgotten in the deep moral prejudice against him. The brutal fact is that an American jury is very ready to flirt with the idea that there are unwritten laws to justify the killing of men who seduce young girls. The fact that the murderer seduced them too is easily forgotten, and he is allowed to become the avenger of womanhood. If the case drags out long enough the original crime is forgotten and the prisoner is dramatized as the victim of a relentless persecution. With the aid of the newspapers we all know our Harry so well by this time that we have identified ourselves with him as we do with the hero of the play. He secures our sympathy as the devil does in Paradise Lost, as Raffles does, as all lawbreakers do who have some flair and distinction. Each of us has in us somewhere a lingering dislike of the state in the guise of a policeman. Perhaps it is a remnant from the oppressed days of our childhood when our legal phil-

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osophy was summed up as "Cheese it, the cop!" At any rate we are easily enlisted on the side of the pursued against the pursuer, and we are all secretly pleased when some minion of the law, say Mr. Jerome, is arrested for playing poker. The crowds who follow Thaw about, who dote upon the watermelon he eats; the newspapers which work us up into a frenzy over whether Harry went home to his mother, have all testified to another great human fact: We are rather fond of a man who sins greatly, whose sin is public and immense, surrounded by floods of money, and open to intimate inspection. The Thaw case was costly and humiliating; but though it would not be proper to say so openly, it was worth the price of admission.

A MORE rational prejudice worked in Thaw's favor, the prejudice against the barbarous conditions of an institution like Matteawan. Many a man who believes Thaw ought to be segregated will hesitate at sending him to a sepulchre like this hospital for the criminal insane. If the state would provide a decent place for isolating its dangerous members, less sympathy would be enlisted in their favor. The terribleness of the punishment appals a decent body of men. They will risk another murder rather than inflict Matteawan upon a man who seems to be fairly rational. This altogether normal bit of human feeling is an ally of almost every criminal who secures publicity. When the penalty is death, or imprisonment in a place like Sing Sing or Matteawan, it is difficult to convict or to secure execution of sentence. A more civilized penal system would make possible far greater efficiency of the criminal law.

THE Becker case is another example of how degrading to a whole state is our present method of punishment. The details of the death-house, the headline announcement that nineteen witnesses have been invited to his execution, the helplessness of his plight, are too much for modern nerves. We cannot punish him without debauching ourselves for weeks on end. When Becker dies we shall read of crowds who watched at the prison gate, and for days we shall be morbid about his death. Becker will probably die gamely, and to thousands he will die a hero. Rosenthal is all but forgotten; what everyone knows is that a strong man is caught in a tangle from which there is probably no escape. We read his plea to the Governor with special sympathy, and the reasonableness of his argument becomes pretty strong. We don't want to take a life on the kind of evidence produced against Becker. We don't like to think that Governor Whitman's future depends upon Becker's death, and the spectacle of the prosecutor become the final judge is repugnant to all sense of fair play. Firmly as we may hold that Becker is guilty of a very desperate crime, it seems a tragic fate that his last hope of mercy should be considered by a man who has the deepest personal grounds for showing him none. If only to save the face of justice, Governor Whitman ought to place the responsibility for the final decision in the hands of someone who is free from the least suspicion of an interest in Becker's death.

MANY foolish charges are being brought against the striking machinists of Bridgeport. They are called unpatriotic, grasping, unscrupulous. But it is surely no treason in American workmen to ask high wages while making munitions for England. The manufacturers do not lower their prices. Nor should the wage earners be blamed for taking advantage of the enormous new demand for their labor, since taking advantage is of the very essence of bargaining. When the labor supply is large, wages are forced down; when it is small, wages are forced up. The claim of the men for an eight-hour day is so far from being exorbitant that it has already been conceded. Even the jurisdictional dispute, the question whether the millwrights shall belong to the Metal Trades Union or to the Carpenters', though exasperating to the employers, is an issue which may be vital to the unions. Unless we are to go over to some other industrial system in which wages and labor conditions are determined by the democratic action of the whole community, we must concede the right to strike whenever conditions are favorable.

THERE is, however, one charge against the Bridgeport union, or rather the union officials, which must be squarely faced. This is the claim that money was paid by German sympathizers to bring on the strike. It is difficult to discuss this accusation without seeming to accept its truth, and we frankly do not at all know whether it is true or false. To make such a charge is an obviously effective way of discrediting the union. On the other hand, Mr. Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, appears to believe that the charge is true. Whether true or false, however, the accusation raises a vital moral question. It is perhaps too much to expect of partisans who believe that a German defeat means the end of our human civilization, that they be over-nice in means. But union officials who are in a position of trust and have the welfare of thousands of wage-earners in their hands are in a different case. If German sympathizers can buy them for a few thousand dollars, politicians and even employers will be no less successful. No one who realizes the immense potentialities of the trade union as an agent of

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democracy can regard the acceptance of bribes by union leaders, if in this case they did accept bribes, as anything short of a calamity. If union officials permit themselves to be swayed by any influence other than the welfare of the workers, they strike at the very foundations of industrial democracy.

A CONFERENCE on the universities and public service will be held in Boston during the last week in August. It has been called by Governor Walsh, and is timed to take place on the same days as the Governor's conference. The meeting is being managed by the Society for the Promotion of Training for Public Service, of which Mr. Charles McCarthy is the enthusiastic and indispensable chief. The object of its organizers is the admirable one of creating additional interest in the attempt to provide in the universities adequate machinery for the training of public servants. The importance of this work can scarcely be exaggerated. The successful realization of a social policy by the states and the nation depends very largely upon the disinterested expert administration of effective legislation. Mr. McCarthy with his associates is working to provide a steady supply of trained men for responsible administrative positions. In so far as he succeeds he will help to relieve the American democracy of its most dangerous and disconcerting weakness—its inability to carry out in a clean and economical manner its own essential business and social purposes.

NEW YORK voted for a Constitutional Convention without the public thinking about it much or caring about it at all. The newspapers give inconspicuous accounts of political quarrels between Republicans and Democrats, and every once in a while they report some freakish proposal, generally made by Mr. Barnes. The public cannot be said to have any knowledge of the issues before the Convention; it is frankly bored. This will be taken, we fear, by some of the ablest delegates at Albany as a sign of democratic incompetence. Yet before they make any rash assumption, they ought to consider whether the leaders at Albany are not failing to seize their opportunity. Are they doing what leaders in a democracy must do, dramatize the issue and educate a following?

THE American Truth Society, 1133 Broadway and ask the elevator boy, has issued a pamphlet advising the reader to get hold of all the gold he can, presumably by honest means. Demand gold at the bank, make the boss put it into the envelope on Saturday night, ask every friend to carry a twenty-dollar gold piece in his pocket. Otherwise J. P. Morgan will lend it all to England, and then where will we be? Under our liberal system anybody can organize a society and call it what he pleases. This one might have been called the Teutonic Neutrality League, or the Bismarck Sweetness and Light Association, without prejudice to its professed objects: "to propagate the history of the United States amongst the people of the United States, and to oppose all attempts to garble, falsify, misrepresent or suppress the history of the United States." The Fatherland may expect every son to do his duty, even if he is away from home, but the average American would rather see history suppressed, or at least badly garbled, than to lug about a pocketful of gold.

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## Charting International Law

NOTWITHSTANDING the utter antipathy of feeling and purpose which exists between the two groups of belligerent powers in Europe, they are in one respect cordially united. They are united in the determination not to let the interests of the average neutral nation interfere with their success. They are seeking either to force the neutral into the war by threats and bribes, or, should persuasion and coercion fail, to make its resources and policy subservient to their advantage. And if neutral independence is suspect, neutral opposition is frankly irritating. The war is costing the belligerents so dear, and such terrifying consequences hang upon defeat, that a neutral which places embarrassing limitations upon the most efficient use of economic or military weapons is treated with scant courtesy. The derivation of these annoying limitations from the law of nations does not make them any more acceptable. The belligerents all agree that precedents are binding on their opponents but not upon themselves. As a result of their steady encroachments on its foundations the whole structure of international law is threatened with collapse. They respect as much or as little of it as their military interest or the inconvenience of neutral displeasure dictates. As Professor Albert Bushnell Hart says, unarmed neutrality has been placed by the war in the position "of a steam launch in a cyclone. However sound and seaworthy, the most it can expect is to live through the storm."

The belligerents not only violate rights of neutrals, but if neutrals have the hardihood to protest they become angry and contemptuous. When the United States objected to the stretching of contraband and to the establishment of an illegal blockade, even liberal English newspapers became righteously indignant at the sordid selfishness of American policy. They accused us of being a nation of shopkeepers who were bent merely on making money out of the tribulations and necessities of other

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peoples. They assumed that the right must be on their side, because right had become associated in their minds with military convenience. They entirely ignored the fact that the Order-in-Council was destructive of the major achievements of the nineteenth century in international law, and that these regulations had been laboriously extorted from sea power precisely for the purpose of keeping neutral commerce alive during war, and of diminishing the losses necessarily wrought by war upon peaceful and inoffensive traders. Great Britain, not content with the enormous advantage which she automatically enjoyed over Germany as a consequence of the strictly legal use of her control of the seas, insisted upon exploiting this prodigious authority and international trust chiefly for her own national benefit.

In the same way the Germans are exhibiting an increasing resentment against the United States, because, while we are forcibly deprived of our legal trade with Germany, we do not voluntarily abandon a large part of our equally legal trade with the Allies. Germany wishes to obtain for herself all the advantages of the rules, but to deny any similar advantages either to neutrals or to her enemies. After having prepared for this war and having insisted on fighting it, she is trying to fasten some kind of responsibility upon others for the inevitable ensuing losses. When Germans become hysterical at the repulsive spectacle of the killing of German soldiers by American shrapnel, they forget that the export of munitions is an essential part of the prevailing military system and one from which they themselves have already profited. There have been more British and French soldiers killed because of the lack of American shrapnel than there have been German soldiers because of its presence. To be sure the United States cannot and should not wholly evade responsibility for participation in the trade, but Germany has less right to object to the practice than has any nation in the world. She is able at the present time to hold her own against the Allies because the large amount of war materials which she sold abroad during and between previous wars, enabled her to build up a technical organization and equipment largely in excess of her own normal needs. The Germans have been preparing for years to meet precisely the existing situation—that is, to fight an enemy which was able to obtain supplies from other countries and which could prevent them from doing the same thing.

Both the English and the Germans argue that because a new engine of warfare, such as the submarine, has been invented, they are fully justified in modifying international law to suit their consequent military convenience. But international law has been formulated not for the purpose of allowing belligerents to take full advantage of the advance of military technology, but for the purpose of restricting the harm done to neutrals and non-combatants by military and naval operations. Underlying it is the humane ideal that peaceful commerce among the nations is the normal and desirable condition, and that when nations go to war the consequent destruction, loss and suffering should be confined so far as possible to the actual fighters. Why should not the invention of an exceedingly destructive and dangerous engine like the submarine be made the excuse rather for diminishing than increasing the losses of neutrals and non-combatants?

The English claim that because the submarine has made a blockade of the old type too dangerous, they are justified in accomplishing the same military result by capturing ships bound to enemy ports on any part of the high seas. But if a blockade of the old type has become too dangerous the answer should be not a new and more sweeping assumption of the power to interfere with neutral commerce, but the abandonment of the principle of the blockade. In the same way if it is inconvenient and dangerous for submarines to make their operations against merchant vessels subject to the law of visit and search, the inference is not that the law of visit and search shall be given up, but that the crew of the submarine shall accept the loss of efficiency and the risk of being hurt as part of the day's work. If the neutral nations of the past and our own forbears had been as anxious to give in to the demands of belligerents as are many Americans at the present time, the fountain of public law would have been dried up at its source.

The crisis is a difficult and a dangerous one for neutrals, but difficult and dangerous as it is, there is no sufficient excuse for tamely submitting to belligerent exactions and aggression. On the contrary the emergency demands vigorous and insistent protests against all encroachments on international law, and stubborn insistence on the idea that if any changes are made at the end of the war they shall be determined by the purpose of increasing rather than diminishing the area during war of peaceful intercourse among nations. To insist upon the superior authority of such normal economic and social service is throughout the present crisis the paramount business of the United States. Even if as an unarmed neutral its position is comparable to that of a steam launch in a cyclone, it is not reduced to the desperate expedient of yielding to the tyranny of the storm. Its very safety, as well as its usefulness, hangs upon the resolute attempt to steer a course and keep some kind of headway. The more the United States insists not merely on the letter of neutral rights but on the social value of the completer human intercourse which those rights are in-

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tended to safeguard and promote, the more successful it will be in bringing its cargo of public law into port.

Neither is the United States as unarmed as its appearance indicates. It has the weapon of its own economic power. The Allies will soon be obtaining from American sources more effective and indispensable assistance than any group of belligerents has ever before obtained from any neutral. They are themselves absolutely dependent upon a flow of international trade which even in its most innocent currents they are forbidding to their enemies. It never seems to occur to them that the American government can use, if it pleases, a much stronger argument than an appeal to precedents in support of its protest against the Order-in-Council. We do not believe in using this argument, but the British government would do well to recognize its existence. The measure of the service which we are rendering to the Allies is the measure of the power which we have over them, and it is the measure also of the resulting responsibility. This kind of power will increase with the future increase of international trade. Firmly and wisely used it will constitute the most effective of all pacifying agencies. Such an agency cannot be used effectively against Germany at the present moment because she was prepared against the loss of her foreign trade in the event of war, but the next time she will not again be so well prepared. Even a completely nationalized economic system cannot be exclusive. In another fifteen years Germany will be almost as much dependent on foreign trade as England is now, and would be as much injured by an effective embargo. The modern nation in arms, with all its resources organized for war, is a far more efficient military instrument than any of the empires of the past, but it is as vulnerable as it is efficient. It needs the aid of the pacific trading countries; and if the pacific nations know how to use their power they can reduce enormously the area and the danger of aggressive militarism and navalism.

## "Vital Interests" a Year Later

IF the diplomats who wrote and made that history return to-day to the reading of their exculpatory Red, White, and Yellow Books they can hardly escape the oppression of a mocking unreality. A year has passed since Austria, to maintain her independence, integrity and sacred honor, addressed her peremptory note to Serbia. A distinct R.S.V.P. was appended to that note. Austria would not wait: not even a few weeks; scarcely a day. She demanded an unconditional and immediate reply.

Why? Why was Austria so jealous in honor, so sudden and quick in quarrel? Why did she risk the world war rather than discuss her grievances with other great powers, equally horrified at the atrocity of Sarajevo? Why could she not permit the assembling of the council of the nations, proposed by Sir Edward Grey? Because it was a vital interest. Unless Serbia were humiliated Austria could not live.

A year ago the Serbian propaganda seemed to Austria the supreme and intolerable evil, which rather than endure she was willing to run the risk of total national extinction. Ten months later she had agreed to submit to spoliation by Italy, to surrender the Trentino and other Austrian territory, and live in peace with Italy ever afterwards. To-day it is believed that she would consent to cede to Rumania part of her empire and no questions asked. In 1914 a merely constructive, hypothetical Serbian attack upon her territory was incompatible with Austria's continued existence as a nation; in 1915 the same country is willing to split herself up, to rid herself of territory held for centuries, in order that the rest of her may live. The vital interests of 1914 seem to have lost their vitality in the short space of one year.

Again, if Serbia, alarmed by Italian ambitions in the east Adriatic, were now to propose an alliance with Austria, is it to be believed that the Dual Monarchy would refuse? She would let bygones be bygones. She would forget and forgive. She would gladly consent to let Serbia go unpunished and unhumiliated, and might even be willing to grant to her additional territory. For Serbia is no longer Austria's chief enemy, and the Serbian interest is no longer a vital interest. Austria has learned the difference between what the diplomats call a vital interest and the real things that mean life or death for a nation.

It is difficult to remember in these latter days, when the deeper issues are being uncovered, how closely this doctrine of vital interests was interwoven with the whole fabric of the diplomacy preceding the war. The entire Austrian and German case rested upon the theory that while the interest of Austria in the suppression of the Serbian agitation was vital, the interests of Russia and the other powers were not vital but only secondary and derivative. Austria therefore should be given a free hand as long as her action did not impair vital interests of the other nations. In it all we find the curious over-emphasis of which the diplomat, like every other specialist, is likely to be guilty. The particular problem upon which the diplomat has long worked overshadows all others. It absorbs him, obsesses him. To lose this one thing is to lose all. Surely Austria might have dragged out some sort of existence, even though

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Serbia had not been castigated or had been punished only to the extent agreed upon by a Concert of the Powers. The diplomats of Vienna, of Berlin and of St. Petersburg, however, projected the supposed offense and the proposed retribution over an immensely wide field of future action. In Austrian eyes a lessening of the punishment, or even a delay of a few days or weeks, would have inevitably reduced the prestige of Austria, and provoked new outrages by Serbia. Step by step it would have led up to the loss of the southern Slav provinces and to the ignominious and bloody dissolution of the Dual Monarchy. To Russia, on the other hand, a punitive expedition against Belgrade meant a destruction of Serbian independence, eventual annexation, the Austrian control of the Balkans, the taking over of Salonica, Constantinople, Asia Minor, and in the end the domination of Europe by the Teutonic empires. For both countries this punitive expedition, its immediate execution or its prevention, was a vital interest.

As for the militarists, they, too, spoke in terms of vital interests. But while the diplomats thought of prestige and bloodless diplomatic victories, the militarists thought of rapidity of action. Austria must speed up her diplomacy in order to anticipate Russian mobilization. Unless Russia hurried she would be confronted by a *fait accompli.* Nor could the German militarists wait. Though about to plunge into a war which would last for years they could not wait even a few hours, because slow-moving Russia was already arming. And so these grim gamblers sat about the table playing with the fate of civilization while one hand held a stop watch and the other fingered a revolver. Germany especially felt that rapidity of mobilization was for her a vital matter. On July thirtieth von Jagow told Cambon that "the heads of the army insisted that all delay was a loss of strength to the German army," and two days later he explained to the British Ambassador, Goschen, that Germany "had the speed and Russia had the numbers." Whatever chance for peace lay in postponement, the vital military interest of the nation lay in priority of action.

And so because of Austria's vital interest in Serbia, and the vital interest of all militarists in the utmost promptitude of mobilization, the great murderous conflict became unavoidable. France was overrun, while in Poland, Galicia, Tyrol, the Caucasus and the Gallipoli, in Asia, Africa and the Pacific Islands, pleasant-faced lads slaughtered other pleasant-faced lads, and in Belgium towns were burned, women raped, children slain, and innocent civilians shot to death. Because Austria could not live if Serbia was unpunished, nameless atrocities were committed by Germany in Belgium.

Herein perhaps lies the key to all this question of vital interests which are not vital. As used by the diplomats a vital interest is a talking-point, an excuse for not entering into controversy. It is like the "sentimental" and immeasurable value which the seller places upon an article for which he will not accept the market value. The real issue lies far below the vital interest. There was no conceivable interest that Austria, or for that matter Russia, had in Serbia which could not have been examined, discussed, and compromised. If Russia on July 23, 1914, could have foreseen July 23, 1915, she would have acknowledged that nothing in Serbia, not her monarch, nor her pigs, nor her *Narodna Odbrana,* was really vital to her. What was vital, or at least immediately important, lay to the west, in Belgium and France, and not in the mountains of Serbia.

We cannot think of this war as even intelligible unless we assume that Germany and Austria were seeking to achieve world dominion or to avert destruction. It is Bernhardi and his fellows who are right, and not the paltering diplomats who talked of vital interests in Serbia, Morocco and elsewhere. If Germany planned the war in the hope that she would capture Paris, destroy the French armies and defeat Russia before the other Powers could move, the scheme, however else we may judge it, was at least intelligible. The immediate reward of such a successful campaign would have transcended all estimation. Germany would have been the dominating power in the world, and in Germany itself one class, the hard, bold, strong men of the East Marches, would have been the dominating force. What the ultimate result might have been, how soon or powerful the recoil, we have no means of knowing. For the present at least there would have been a great revolution in the world, and the masters of that revolution would have been famous—or what is often much the same, infamous—in history. The world would have centered about the Prussian Junker.

Such an incitement to war would be at least comprehensible. Or if Germany and Austria precipitated this conflict or were precipitated into it by the steady aggression of three hostile Powers intent upon destroying Germany, that too would in some measure be intelligible. What is clear is that whatever the true cause of the war, the "vital interest" with which the diplomats played was little more than an excuse for hostilities. What becomes of Serbia, now that she has been the excuse for this vast conflagration, is as unimportant to Austro-Hungary a year after the war began as is the fate of Prinzip and Gabrilowicz, the half-forgotten "heroes" of Sarejevo.

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# "The Deeper Preparedness"

ON the same day last week we received two criticisms of an article in these columns called "The Deeper Preparedness." One criticism was an editorial in the Chicago *Tribune*. It said THE NEW REPUBLIC was producing "a neat device for the permanent shelving of the problem of national defence" by asking for some preliminary discussion of the foreign policy which the armament would support. The other criticism was in a letter from the vice-chairman of the Woman's Peace Party. Mrs. Crystal Eastman Benedict insisted that no good could come from talking about the foreign policy behind the armament, because armament in itself was the most dangerous element of foreign policy.

The two critics are agreed on everything but their conclusions. Neither believes that armament should be prepared in relation to a foreign policy. The *Tribune* asks for military reinforcements as an immediate precaution. Mrs. Benedict objects to them as an immediate danger. Both feel that American foreign policy is no immediate part of the problem of national defence. To insist that it is, seems to both of them a somewhat ultra-rational way of looking at things.

With no desire to chop logic we desire to point out to our contradictory but united critics that each of them assumes a vague foreign policy in the very criticism offered. Says Mrs. Benedict: "Beyond advocating what is an inherent and inevitable part of the pacifist platform, i.e., a non-aggressive national policy, it is not necessary for the peace movement to concern itself in the first instance with questions of international policy." Says the *Tribune*: "May we not hazard the hypothesis that we are in a world and stage of development in which nations still on occasion take the sword?" The hypothesis is not at all hazardous. They do take the sword. But what nations are likely to take the sword against us? Is it England or Germany or Japan, is it the Quadruple Entente or the Dual Alliance? Surely it is not mere editorial writing, but sound strategy, to think out the terms of your preparedness. Nations do not arm in the abstract, they arm against potential enemies. When Turkey collapsed in the Balkan war, Germany added several army corps. She did it, as Prince Bülow tells us, because she felt that the weakening of Turkey was a weakening of Germany. When England has prepared her naval estimates in the last ten years, she has not built ships "to meet a stage of development." She has built them to meet Germany. She did not build them to meet us, or France, or Japan. She built them to meet the diplomatic situation. Why then should the *Tribune* ask us to greet the unseen with a cheer?

A few examples may make the point clearer. The belief is widespread that there may be trouble with Japan. Every sane person hopes and prays that statesmanship and good sense can avert it, yet it would be folly to ignore the possibility. We have offered and are offering an insult to the Japanese people. But we alone are not offering it. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have taken the same position toward the Japanese, and what is called the California problem is really an Anglo-American problem. England is Japan's ally, but a big part of the British Empire is on the American side in the issues with Japan. Surely the solution of the problem lies in some understanding in the Pacific entered into by the three Powers concerned. The first act for American statesmanship is to make an understanding with the British Empire for negotiations with Japan. It is a common problem. Why should we "prepare" alone, when it is possible either to solve the question with British help or to fight it out with her aid?

Again, take the vague responsibilities known as the Monroe Doctrine. How can we possibly know how large a navy is required until we know where the A. B. C. Powers stand, where Great Britain stands, where Germany stands? We could not "defend" it against a coalition of Europe. Against whom and for what ought we then to defend it? How can an intelligent Secretary of the Navy draw up his program unless he has some answer to these questions?

We can well imagine Mrs. Benedict's impatience as she reads this "militarist" argument with the "militarist" *Tribune*. She would, we imagine, be altogether out of sympathy with all the underlying assumptions. She is working with great force and sincerity to root out the international conceptions upon which the *Tribune* and THE NEW REPUBLIC are, after all, fairly well agreed. She would say, we presume, that Japanese exclusion and the Monroe Doctrine are aggressive policies which ought to be abandoned, now or later, if force is required to uphold them. But how are we to abandon Japanese exclusion? It is California that excludes the Japanese, and it would be practically impossible to force California to admit them. If we understand the temper of California, it is that her citizens would resist a flood of Japanese immigration to the limit. They would say that membership in the American Union was not worth the price of a tremendous race problem. If the issue came to the sticking point, we should have to choose between coercing California as the virtual ally of Japan, and backing up California. How would

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Mrs. Benedict meet this issue? How would she define a "non-aggressive national policy" in terms of California? Can she refuse to define it and still ask us to abandon the very idea of armed defence?

## Leo Frank

IN ancient times when a man was treated as Leo Frank has been treated people felt that an obscene god was pursuing him. No mortal could be so relentless. No mortal could surround another with such ingenious cruelty. Only a conspiracy of fate could make horror so massive. We try nowadays to think differently, but in the case of Frank it is not easy. If he is innocent, as the evidence seems to show, then no one can realize or express the pitilessness of his fate. There are actually men living in that community whose comment on the attempt to murder Frank was a request for the pardon of the assassin, a man who had already killed two fellow-creatures. They are not exceptional fiends. Their bloodlust is only the extreme logic of Georgia's whole action in the Frank case. Leaving out Governor Slaton, who risked his future and his life to uphold a civilization better than Georgia has yet attained, the treatment of Frank was one prolonged lynching. The convict who cut his throat differed from the mobs, much of the press, and most of the officials only in this, that he had an opportunity to carry out what they wanted to do. One might almost say that he had a mandate from the mobs of Georgia.

It is often foolish to indict a whole people. But in this instance the guilt of the people is clear. They wrecked the only trial Frank has had, they believed every lie about him, they terrorized their public officials. They have made democracy hideous—they, the men and women of the state. There was a minority that knew better, a minority that did not wish to make the courts of the state a vile spectacle to the whole nation. But of that minority many were too cowardly to speak out. They allowed the mob to stamp its own imprint upon the public character of the state. The governor who acted, and the opinion which supported him, were not enough to save Georgia from its degradation. Never was a plainer example of the immediate and personal responsibility of every grown person in the state. A people is responsible for the tone of its government. The people of Georgia have allowed a crime to be perpetrated. By their silence they will sanction it. If they allow this case to be forgotten they are putting the sanction of a whole state upon the inevitable verdict of mankind.

That verdict is very clear. A people which cannot preserve its legal fabric from violence is unfit for self-government. It belongs in the category of communities like Haiti, communities which have to be supervised and protected by more civilized powers. Georgia is in that humiliating position to-day. And curiously enough the nearest thing to a political ideal in the whole state is the importance of its own state rights. Georgia is peculiarly jealous of its sovereignty. But it is not jealous enough to preserve that sovereignty from being defiled, or to exercise its power as a trustee of American civilization. If the Frank case is evidence of Georgia's political development, then Georgia deserves to be known as the black sheep of the American Union.

We say this in all seriousness. It is a poor future for a country which contains communities so backward. How are we to strengthen American civilization, how are we to play a humane role in the congress of nations, how are we to meet any of our problems with decent sanity, if we are in part composed of a people as cowardly, as incompetent, as barbarous, and as ignorant as so many people of Georgia have shown themselves to be? How can anything be done with a state which cannot conduct a court of justice?

Within the last year the word Georgia to most Americans has meant the lynching of Leo Frank. The state is associated with that case; its standing is reckoned by it. Inevitably one looks about for some remedy. It seems incredible that the Georgians cannot shake themselves together and redeem their title to self-government. If they don't, there is perhaps no remedy under American law. It may yet become necessary to invite the Bryce Commission to Atlanta. The commission has reported ably on the atrocities in Belgium.

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# Ideals of Organization

THE issues of so great a struggle as the present one are necessarily compounded of intricate and complex factors, and necessarily they change as the vast catastrophe works on. Last autumn the most obvious aspect was the combined resistance of Russia and western liberalism against the flamboyant imperialism of the German court and the Berliners. The war was dynastic. We fought the latest of the dynasts. We resisted a vulgar, modernized Caesarism. We did more than resist it; we broke it and defeated it. Whatever the outcome of this war, it will mean now no such triumph of court and privilege and hereditary aristocracy as the entry of William II into Paris in 1914 would have involved. The Marne battle ended that. Nothing is more remarkable than the relative disappearance of the Emperor and the Crown Prince—and Gott—from this struggle. It is manifest even in the post-card shops of Berlin; not even that impassioned American citizen, Mr. Viereck of *The Fatherland,* would now produce poems about "Thou Prince of Peace, thou God of War!" if he wished to stir Teutonic hearts; it is another people, an altogether more respectable and more formidable people that the allied world has to reckon with. The tawdry, intensely nationalist "imperialism" of Unter den Linden, the Teutonic "Gott," the "aristocratic" officer with a weakness for champagne and frightfulness, shooting of peasants and rapes in marketplaces, the swagger and the uniform and all that figured as most typically German last August drift towards the negligible. Behind the Germany of William II there appears the Germany of Professor Ostwald, of the Zeiss factories, of Essen—the true modern Germany, a very great and formidable nation. Its watchword is organization. It justifies its monarchy almost contemptuously. The family of Potsdam is, from the new point of view, the grain of causative matter, important only by position and function, about which there has gathered concentrically the pearl of national obedience. It is with this revealed Germany that the democratic forces of the world have now to deal. It continues the war, and it states its case anew. It is fighting extraordinarily well, far better than the headlong, boasting, threatening Germany of the Junkers which was held and repulsed on the east and on the west and driven from the seas in 1914. And it has abandoned its reliance upon divine right for a saner and altogether more valid claim.

There comes to hand from the University of Neuchâtel a very timely and interesting pamphlet by Professor van Gennep, entitled "The Spirit of Organization; a Contrast of the French and English Formula as opposed to the German," in which he states what one may call the democratic-individualist point of view as opposed to the German conception of order, very brilliantly and ably. He chooses Professor Ostwald as his antagonist, and he writes his case against the German idea, be it noted, with scarcely a mention of either Nietzsche or Bernhardi. So shifts the front of the intellectual conflict. The Germany of 1915 has passed away from Bernhardi; Ostwald is its prophet. Professor Ostwald fares badly in this pamphlet both as a dialectician and as a patriotic and amateurish ethnologist, but Professor van Gennep has the wisdom and generosity to go behind the ill-advised forms and phrases of the great German's expression, to his fundamental proposition. That fundamental proposition is this: that "individualism" as a stage of social development has to give place to "organization"; and that "organization" is a new and higher level to which Germany is leading the nations. It is not difficult for Professor van Gennep to show that in social, intellectual, and economic development as distinguished from political elaboration, America and France and England and not Germany were the pioneers of organization, and that the real opposition intended is not between order and chaos as Professor Ostwald imagines, but between authoritative state socialism and voluntarism—as a synonym for which Professor van Gennep frequently uses the word "co-operation." And upon the ground thus cleared Professor van Gennep draws his morals and conclusions, and frames his anticipations of the outcome of the war. He foreshadows the triumph of the individualist democratic idea, triumphing through cooperative activities that will mitigate the rigors of individual and national competition, and he crowns this triumph in an ultimately republican United States of Europe. It is possible to sympathize very warmly with his spirit and still doubt the validity of these hopes or the completeness of the individualist "formula" as a recipe for the most desirable social organization.

At the present time the English mind is in no mood to accept Professor van Gennep's interpretation of its motives. It is very largely occupied with a number of the less pleasing consequences of the individualist formula in practice. It is out of tone with individualism. Many American minds must also be finding an interest in consequences of a kindred sort. The first of these less satisfactory

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consequences of individualism is the relative ineffectiveness of a democratically chosen government in all practical things. It is no use denying that the central powers were not only better prepared for this war at the outset, but that on the whole they have met the occasions of the war as they have so far arisen with much more collective intelligence, will power, and energy than any of the Allies, not even excepting France. They have succeeded not merely in meeting enormous military requirements better, but in keeping the material side of their national life steadier under greater stresses. It is idle for this writer to pretend to think that the United States would make any better showing in this matter than Great Britain. The British government has been excellent in argument and admirable in rhetoric, but it has been slack, indolent, and unready in all matters of material organization; it has muddled and wasted national feeling, and it has been manifestly afraid of the press and over-sensitive to public clamor. It has shown all the merits and failures one might have expected from a body of political lawyers, trained in the arts of making things *seem* right, wary and prepared to wait and see what chances the adversary will give, and as incapable of practical foresight, as remote from the business of making real things *go* right, as enclosed nuns. If the present governments of Great Britain and the United States are the best sort of governments that democracy can produce, then Professor Ostwald is much more right than Professor van Gennep is prepared to confess, and democracy is bound, if not this time then next time or the time after, to be completely overcome and superseded by some form of authoritative state organization.

And the deficiencies of the "liberty state" as we know it are by no means confined to the badness of its governmental product; that is merely the initial weakness of an extensive system of failures that this war enables very many people to realize now for the first time. The first of these problems of failure is the "shirker," who is merely in relation to the militant necessities of the situation what the "blackleg" has been to economic necessity. The thesis of democracy is that there is a nobility in men and a power in public opinion that will make all free citizens who are conscious of their citizenship exert and sacrifice themselves for the general good to an extent greater than they would do under any sort of compulsion. An immense note of interrogation hangs over this proposition at the present time. That the disposition of the majority will be to do so is unquestionable; the perplexing question for our democratic states is: What happens in the case of the exceptions, and how do these exceptions affect immediately and ultimately the *morale* of the general body? If the blackleg, the shirker, the grafter, the traitor, get an advantage by their exceptional refusal to behave decently, if they remain behind to breed and marry while the generous spirits go out to fight and die, if they profit and increase while honest men remain poor, then bad citizenship has "survival value" as compared with good citizenship, and there is a manifest discouragement of all the good impulses in men. Democracy means in that case not merely administrative weakness but a secular degenerative process. Its best elements will die progressively for its worst. The generally accepted theory of democracy can scarcely deny the existence of these exceptional base instances, but it declares that there is a generosity and power in public opinion that will more than correct the evil of mean and selfish aims. That indeed "self-sacrifice is the best policy." The present time is bringing forward the doubt whether this is so, in a very acute form.

This assumption of the righting influence of public opinion is implicit throughout Professor van Gennep's pamphlet, and being granted, there is little to complain of in the rest of his case. He explains how the "esprit de cooperation égalitaire" exists in the case of the western allies and not in the case of Germany, that it has been fostered by games and strikes alike, that our women of the industrial class have been disciplined to endurance by the voluntary resistances of strikes. . . . But the plain question at once confronts us whether the voluntary collective will of the western allies is as a matter of fact any stronger or clearer than the trained and ruled collective will of the central powers. There can be little doubt which side has achieved the higher collective efficiency. It is not the western side. And the quality of Professor van Gennep's assertions about the spirit of the democracies in this conflict seems all through to be tainted by the desire to see them rather as they ought to be than as they are. It is possible to believe that democracy is being at present tried and modified rather than triumphantly demonstrated, and that the best social ideal is as yet not realized by any human society, that it lies between the two conceptions or, if you prefer, it involves both the two conceptions that play behind the "organization" of Professor Ostwald and the "freedom" of Professor van Gennep.

It is not only that individualistic democracy has produced no real assurance against the danger within—the danger of unpunished shirking and self-seeking, the danger that its necessary virtues carry with them less survival value than does the neglect of these necessary virtues—but also it has no effective guarantees against a certain form of attack

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from without. It trusts to public opinion, but it does nothing to insure the soundness or purity of public opinion. Interests at home or foreign powers are at liberty to do their utmost to control and purchase this controlling force of the democratic state. Professor van Gennep seems altogether too prone to regard public opinion and the spirit of a nation as a magically secure thing. No one who has studied Ford Madox Hueffer's recent remarkable book on Prussian culture, "When Blood is their Argument," can rest very comfortably in such a belief. Through books, newspapers, pulpits, theatres, cinematographs, schools and colleges, the mind of a people can be systematically molded and modified. Professor Ostwald's "organization state" is prepared to do that not only with its own people but, as the recent German press campaign in America shows, with the minds of any other peoples who stand in its way. That campaign has been clumsy and unsuccessful so far, but there is no intrinsic reason why it should always be clumsy and unsuccessful. The individualistic democratic state has no sure protection whatever against that form of attack.

It is possible then for a firm believer in freedom and democracy to read Professor van Gennep's eloquent assertion of these ideals at the present time in a very critical and chastened spirit. The relative feebleness, the practical incompetence, the forensic quality of democratic governments may excuse a doubt whether, in the method of election by a single non-transferable vote, democracy has really found its effective method of governing; the existence, prosperity, and predominance of evaders, self-seekers, and profiteers may open the question whether an unrestricted "go as you please," is the ultimate rule of freedom; and the unlimited possibilities in a free press run for gain, of venality, vulgarity, and treason, the fluctuations and light-mindedness of such a press, may perforce open up the prospect of ultimately making the press a power in the state at least as responsible as the state's educational organization. The strains and experiences of this world conflict may, in fact, be bringing us to realize that democracy is not only a newer thing in the world than the authoritative state it seeks to destroy, but also that it is something much less mature, with a completer development of its powers and a completer mental organization still to come. At best it may be as yet no more than an infant Hercules fighting adult serpents by instinct rather than intelligence. The electoral method that will save it from the party politician is still to seek; it has still to establish its mutual disciplines and possess its mind.

H. G. Wells.

# As an Alien Feels

TWENTY-FIVE years ago I knew but dimly that the United States existed. My first dream of it came, as well as I remember, from the strange gay flag that blew above a circus tent on the Green. It was a Wild West Show, and for years I associated America with the intoxication of the circus and, for no reason, with the tang of oranges. "Two a penny, two a penny, large penny oranges! Buy away an' ate away, large penny oranges!" They were oranges from Seville then, but the odor of them and the fumes of circus excitement gave me a first gay ribald sense of the United States.

The next allied sense was gathered from a scallawag uncle. He had sought his fortune in America —sought it, as I infer now, on the rear end of a horse-car. When he came home he was full of odd and delicious oaths. "Gosh hell hang it" was his chief touch of American culture. He was a "Yank" in local parlance, a frequently drunken Yank. His fine drooping moustache too often drooped with porter. Once, a boy of nine, I steadied him home under the October stars and absorbed a long alcoholic reverie on the Horseshoe Falls. As we slept together that night in the rat-pattering loft, and as he absently appropriated all the horse-blanket, I had plenty of chance to shiver over the wonderments of the Horseshoe Falls.

This, with an instilled idea that America and America alone could offer "work," foreshadowed the American landscape. It is the bald hope of work that finally magnetizes us hither. But every dream and every loyalty was with the unhappy land from which I came.

For many months the music of New York harbor spoke only of home. Every outgoing steamer that opened its throat made me homesick. America was New York, and New York was down-town, and down-town was a vortex of new duties. There I learned the bewildering foreign tongue of earning a living, and the art of eating at Childs'. At night the hall-bedroom near Broadway, and the resourceless promenade up and down Broadway for amusement. The only women to say "dear" the women who say it on the street.

In Chicago, not in New York, I found the United States. The word "settlement" gave me my first puzzled intimation that there was somewhere a clue to this grim struggle down-town. I had looked for it in boarding-houses. I had looked for it in stenographic night-schools. I had sought it in the blotchy Sunday newspaper, in Coney Island, in long jaunts up the Palisades. I had looked for it among the street-walkers, the first to proffer intimacy. And of course, not being clever enough, I had over-

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looked it. But in Chicago, as I say, I came on it at home.

America dawned for me in a social settlement. It dawned for me as a civilization and a faith. In all my first experiences of my employers I got not one glimpse of American civilization. Theirs was the language of smartness, alertness, brightness, success, efficiency, and I tried to learn it, but it was a difficult and alien tongue. Some of them were lawyers, but they were interested in penmanship and ability to clean ink-bottles. Some of them were business men, but they were interested in ability to typewrite and to keep the petty cash. It was not their fault. Ours was not an affair of the heart. But if it had not been for the social settlement I should still be an alien to the bone.

Till I knew a social settlement the American flag was still a flag on a circus-tent, a gay flag but cheap. The cheapness of the United States was the message of quick-lunch and the boarding-house, of vaudeville and Coney Island and the Sunday newspaper, of the promenade on Broadway. In the social settlement I came on something entirely different. Here on the ash-heap of Chicago was a blossom of something besides success. The house was saturated in the perfume of the stockyards, to make it sweet. A trolley-line ran by its bedroom windows, to make it musical. It was thronged with Jews and Greeks and Italians and soulful visitors, to make it restful. It was inhabited by highstrung residents, to make it easy. But it was the first place in all America where there came to me a sense of the intention of democracy, the first place where I found a flame by which the melting-pot melts. I heard queer words about it. The men, I learned, were molly-coddles, and the women were sexually unemployed. The ruling class spoke of "unsettlement workers" with animosity, the socialists of a mealy-mouthed compromise. Yet in that strange haven of clear humanitarian faith I discovered what I suppose I had been seeking—the knowledge that America had a soul.

How one discovers these things is hard to put honestly. It is like trying to recall the first fair wind of spring. But I know that slowly and unconsciously the atmosphere of the settlement thawed out the asperity of alienism. There were Americans of many kinds in residence, from Illinois, from Michigan, from New York, English-Americans, Russian-Americans, Austrian-Americans, German-Americans, men who had gone to Princeton and Harvard, women spiritually lavendered in Bryn Mawr. The place bristled with hyphens. But the Americanism was of a kind that opened to the least pressure from without, and never shall I forget the way these residents with their "North Side" friends had managed so graciously to domesticate the annual festival of my own nationality. That, strange though it may seem, is the more real sort of Americanization Day.

From Walt Whitman, eventually, the naturalizing alien breathes in American air, but I doubt if I should have ever known the meaning of Walt Whitman had I not lived in that initiating home. It was easy in later years to see new meanings in the American flag, to stand with "Ethiopia Saluting the Colors," but it was in the settlement I found the sources from which it was dyed. For there, to my amazement, one was not expected to believe that man's proper place is on a Procrustean bed of profiteering. A different tradition of America lived there, one in which the earlier faiths had come through, in which the way to heaven was not necessarily up a skyscraper. In New England, later, I found many ideas of which the settlement was symptomatic, but as I imbibed them they were "America" for me.

What it means to come at last into possession of Lincoln, whose spirit is so precious to the social settlement, is probably unintelligible to Lincoln's normal inheritors. To understand this, however, is to understand the birth of a loyalty. In the countries from which we come there have been men of such humane ideals, but they have almost without exception been men beyond the pale. The heroes of the peoples of Europe have not been the governors of Europe. They have been the spokesmen of the governed. But here among America's governors and statesmen was a simple authenticator of humane ideals. To inherit him becomes for the European not an abandonment of old loyalties, but a summary of them in a new. In the microcosm of the settlement perhaps Lincolnism is too simple. Many of one's promptest acquiescences are revised as one meets and eats with the ruling class later on. But the salt of this American soil is Lincoln. When one finds that one is naturalized.

It is curious how the progress of naturalization becomes revealed to one. I still recollect with a thrill the first time I attended a national political convention and listened to the roll-call of the States. "Alabama! Arizona! Arkansas!" Empty names for many years, at last they were filled with one clear concept, the concept of the democratic experiment. "As I have walk'd in Alabama my morning walk"—the living appeal to each state by name recalled Whitman's generous amusing scope. "Far breath'd land! Arctic braced! Mexican breez'd The diverse! The compact! The Pennsylvanian! The Virginian! The double Carolinian!" The orotund roll-call was not intended to evoke Whitman. It was intended, as it happened, to evoke votes for Taft and Sherman. But even these men were parts of the democratic experiment. And

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the vastly peopled hall answered for Whitman, as the empurpled Penrose did not answer. It was they who were the leaves of our grass.

In Whitman, as William James has shown, there is an arrant mysticism, a mysticism which his own "Democratic Vistas" exposed in cold light. Yet into this credulity as to the virtue and possibilities of the people an alien is likely to enter if his first intimacy with America came in the aliens' crêche. A settlement is a crêche for the step-children of Europe, and it is hard not to credit America at large with some of the impulses that make the settlement. Such, at any rate, is the tendency I experienced myself.

With this tendency, what of loyalty to the United States? I think of Lincoln and his effected mysticism by Union, union for the experiment, and I feel alive within me a complete identification with this land. The keenest realization of the nation reached me, as I recall, the first time I saw the capitol in Washington. Quite unsuspecting I strolled up the hill from the station, just about midnight, the streets gleaming after a warm shower. The plaza in front of the capitol was deserted. A few high sentinel lamps threw a lonely light down the wet steps and scantily illumined the pillars. Darkness veiled the dome. Standing apart completely by myself, I felt as never before the union of which this strength and simplicity was the symbol. The quietude of the night, the scent of April pervading it, gave to the lonely building a dignity such as I had seldom felt before. It seemed to me to stand for a fine and achieved determination, for a purpose maintained, for a quiet faith in the peoples and states that lay away behind it to far horizons. Lincoln, I thought, had perhaps looked from those steps on such a night in April, and felt the same promise of spring.

In the daylight, no doubt, the capitol is different, a maze of practical politicians. But it is not from these men's activities that the alien derives his final belief—his belief that, however they fail, there is in these states a touchstone of humanity, and that here men may renew themselves to a free and conscious end.

FRANCIS HACKETT.

# The Legacy of August Bebel

A NEW Power made its entry this week on the European scene, a great Power which boasts a population of about twenty millions, and an organization second only to that of Prussia. I mean the German social democracy. Through ten months of war it has been content to efface itself; this week, in its belated appeal to the German government to take the initiative in proposing peace, it lives again. Hitherto it has counted, in so far as it counted at all, only among the assets of German diplomacy. No one outside its own ranks rates the adroitness of that diplomacy very highly, but to one of its achievements the world has done less than justice. It mobilized for the cruelest war in modern history the Socialist party which had hitherto seemed to be not merely the strongest but also the most solid and independent in Europe. The feat was quite simple, and it was accomplished in the week which preceded the outbreak of war. When the German Socialists, on the last peaceful Sunday which the Continent enjoyed, were holding their mass meetings to protest against war, the authorities were clever enough not merely to tolerate but even to encourage their demonstrations. They drew the natural inference: they concluded that so far from meditating aggression, the German Chancellor really desired peace. Their critical faculties were disarmed by this complaisance, and when war came they rallied to the Kaiser's government because their experience of its attitude towards themselves inclined them to believe in its innocence.

There are two possible explanations of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's attitude in this matter. One of them is that while he did undoubtedly seek a bluffing diplomatic victory over Russia, won as so many earlier German successes had been won, by the rattling of a sabre which it was unnecessary to unsheathe, he did not desire actual war. On that theory he was fighting, weakly and rather stupidly, against the war party at court and in the army, and gladly welcomed the Socialists as a reinforcement. The other theory is that he intended war from the first, and played his cards so as to deceive the Socialists. Their support was indispensable at home, and it was worth much abroad, since it gave color to the German contention that the war was for Germany a necessity of defense. The former theory is, to my thinking, the more probable, but on either showing the official management of the Socialists was successful and adroit. They became for some months a tame imperial party, His Majesty's proletariat.

There were good and quite respectable reasons why the German Socialists dropped inevitably into their support of this war. Eight years ago, at the

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Stuttgart Socialist Congress, Bebel declared that if ever the German government made war on Russia, he for one, old man though he was, would shoulder a rifle in the war of liberation. It was one of the last really significant things that Bebel said, and it lived after him. There was no timid qualification about aggressive motives in that pronouncement. Bebel thought of war with a German mind; not as an act wrong in itself, but as an act good or evil according as its consequences to the working class should be good or evil. It was French and English philosophy which invented utilitarian morals, but it is the Germans who alone have really absorbed the point of view. A French or English Socialist starts from the assumption that war is inherently wrong, though defence may be a painful necessity; Bebel argued that a war with Russia would be a blessing, since it would liberate the Russian masses from czardom, and eventually weaken even the German reaction. The scientific Marxist attitude towards history may be intellectually far above the simple emotional attitude of the French and English masses, but it is a world-disaster when it inspires such risky and arrogant calculations as this.

Bebel's saying, spoken in cold blood in an hour of peace, was remembered when war actually broke out. It happened to play on the most rooted and intimate fears of the German democracy. We in the west, as Marcel Sembat pointed out some months before he entered the French Cabinet, have never quite realized how Germans regard Russia. For us she is a safely distant Power. We can afford to think of her novels and her music. We can personify her as the nation which produced Tolstoy and Kropotkin. We know her through her exiles. For the Germans she is the semi-barbarous neighbor across the frontier, with the population which is eighty per cent illiterate, and those Cossacks whose name still recalls the devastations of the Seven Years War. A war with Russia was consecrated first of all by Bebel's calculations and then by primitive fears. It was easy, moreover, to argue that since Russia had mobilized while negotiations were entering a hopeful phase, she was morally the aggressor. But the morality of aggression is a vague and distant conception. When war means, as in Belgium and East Prussia it did mean, the burning of villages and the peril of non-combatants, the only fact that matters is the physical fact of invasion. One cannot pause to consider whether the invasion was provoked. It has to be repelled. The German Socialists could no more pause to inquire whether it was Austrian imperialism which provoked the war, than the French Socialists could take account of the fact that the hated Russian alliance had endangered France.

Liebknecht, indeed, and the heroic women of the party, opposed the war from the first, but theirs was rather an opposition to all war than a special objection to this war. On that platform the German Socialists could not rally. Their recovery began when Bernstein declared that the war, which was originally a war of defence against Russia, had changed its character and become a war of aggression against the western liberal Powers. The movement went further when Haase, Bernstein, and Kautsky came together to issue their daring minority manifesto against a policy of conquest. The success of that bold challenge has apparently convinced even the most warlike of the Socialist right, the Scheidemanns and the Heines, that they no longer reflect the feelings of the proletariat. The whole party has now, through its executive, declared loudly against any annexations and summoned the German government to take the first step towards peace. The party is itself again. Bebel's hazardous political calculations seem to-day a remote exercise in historical dialectics, when they are weighed against the present fact of slaughter and impoverishment. The fear of the Russian millions must seem in retrospect sufficiently absurd, as Mackensen's phalanx drives the Czar's armies before it.

As the Prussian Junkers and the National Liberal individualists exercise their victorious fancies on the various economic gains which are to follow German successes in the field, the German Socialists have returned to their old settled conviction that modern war is a function and expression of modern capitalism. They see the blood of their dead comrades fertilizing the business of Hamburg shippers and metallurgical trusts. It is for the iron of Lorraine and Morocco, the railways of Belgium and the markets of Turkey, that the war is being waged to-day. Their perception of that ghastly fact is of course qualified by the knowledge that similar conditions exist in the rival camp. They no more desire to collapse before the appetites of the coalition than they wish to aid German dreams of world-dominion. They have, accordingly, chosen their moment. They have called for peace while German arms are evidently victorious. Their good gesture may have its consequences for the time being, and for some time to come. It may inspire German diplomacy to make some indirect effort to secure peace. It might sap the aggressive spirit of the German armies if that effort were too long delayed. But emphatically it is not a sign of weakness, and if the fortunes of war should turn, if the Allies could invade German soil and threaten partitions, spoliations, indemnities—then, once more, we may be certain, German Socialism would rally to the defence of Germany.

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The tragedy of such a fine initiative as the German Socialists have taken is that it cannot conceivably evoke a response from the Allied camp. The very reason which has made it easy for the German Socialists to make it, prohibits the French Socialists or the British Labor party from taking a similar step. The Germans waited for an hour of indisputable military success, and the proletariat of the Allied countries could second the German prayer for peace only if they were ready to accept the fact of relative military failure. It is not any concrete point in the settlement which really stands in the way of peace. Public opinion in Britain is resolute about the evacuation of Belgium and France, and on that point the extremest pacifist is as determined as the wildest imperialist. I doubt if public opinion either here or in France would insist on fighting for another year over Alsace-Lorraine. I am quite sure that all our professors have utterly failed to create any decided public resolve about the Near East. It is not the wish that Serbia should get Bosnia, or Russia Constantinople, that really stands in the way of a peace based on reasonable compromises. The obstacle to any early peace is something much simpler, much deeper, much more fundamental, than any plan for rearranging the map of Europe. It is the elementary resolution that Germany must be beaten. Some would say that she must be "crushed"; others would prefer the abstract phrase that her "militarism" must be destroyed, while others again talk frankly of vengeance and punishment.

These variations are a matter of temperament. What nine men in ten mean by them is the plain resolve that Germany must be beaten in the field. It is partly a moral judgment, partly a political calculation, partly a sporting instinct, and undoubtedly it is the deepest and most enduring sentiment which we have known in these islands for a century. Our "intellectuals," a small, divided, and as yet a nearly negligible factor, have much to urge, even now, on the other side. "Surely," they ask, "it is better to secure the evacuation of Belgium by negotiation, than to insist on fighting over every inch of her devastated soil until all she was and is has been razed to the ground? As for Alsace, if it really wants to be annexed to France, why not bargain it against tropical colonies? If Poland is the obstacle, the German plan of an independent kingdom seems preferable to the Russian plan of a doubtfully autonomous province. It is very well to fight for the security of France, but how safe will she be when, as may well happen, a fourth of her men of military age have been maimed or killed?"

These arguments, unluckily, evolve no response, and as yet they are hardly uttered in public. The will to defeat Germany is unshaken, intolerant, and supreme. Until the Allies have tested the effects of a reorganized service of munitions, and until the full force of the new Kitchener armies has been felt in the field, there will be in London and Paris no thought of any early peace. The comparative collapse of Russia, so far from hastening peace, can only protract the war, for the Allies dare not, with any regard to the future, allow her to pay the costs of an indecisive peace. The late entry of Italy means also that the war must be prolonged until her purposes are within sight of fulfilment. The response of western socialism to the German initiative cannot come until the western Powers seem to be on the point of winning, and it will then encounter the resistance not of one but of four or five allied imperialisms, each bent on justifying the war by concrete gains. The German Socialists, in short, have at last saved their own souls, but they have spoken too late to save Europe.

H. N. Brailsford.

London, July.

# An Inconclusive Peace

THE world desires peace, no doubt; but peace according to specifications. The Germans must be beaten back to the Rhine, declare the Allies. Prussian militarism must be extirpated; the plow must be passed through the ashes of Essen. Else we shall have a truce, perhaps, but no peace. There can be no abiding peace, declare the Teutons, until France prays for it upon her knees, until Russia is paralyzed, and British navalism and commercial imperialism are thrust back into history. Else the immeasurable suffering and gigantic costs of the war will have been borne in vain. After nineteen hundred years of experimentation, must we still confess our inability to make war yield gain, thistles bring forth figs?

In England and France, in Germany and Austria, it is treason to despair of a peace that shall be dictated to the prostrate foe. Even here in America a man counts for a pernicious pessimist if he doubts that the wrong (wherever that may lie) will be utterly crushed. And yet when one reflects upon the extravagant cost in men and munitions requisite to the shifting of the stubborn battle line in France by even a hundred yards, he will search in vain for substantial grounds for his belief in the definite triumph of one party or the other. The Allies can break the German line when they are ready to pay the price: 100,000 men, more or less. The Germans can attain a similar end, at the same price. But say that a thin wedge has

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thus been thrust through the line of defenses, how much remains to be done, and at what cost, before the Germans are pushed back to the Rhine, or the French to the Pyrenees? And nothing less is implied in the definitive triumph of the one side or the other. Events on the Adriatic, in the Dardanelles or in Poland, will doubtless count for something in the final settlement. But such events cannot rob the fields of France and Belgium of their primary importance. Here it will be decided whether or not peace shall be concluded between parties each of whom is quite capable of renewing the conflict if the terms proposed too seriously offend its pride or prejudice its interest. What kind of peace Europe shall have lies on the knees of the gods. But almost certainly it is not the kind of peace anyone, either belligerent or neutral, would prescribe.

An inconclusive peace: then the whole agonizing work will have to be done over. So most of us say. And yet it is not the verdict of history that complete victories are conducive to peace, nor that drawn conflicts are provocative of further war. Most of the wars of Napoleon were sufficiently conclusive. After Austerlitz Napoleon was in position to wreak his will upon Austria, nor did he neglect the opportunity. Yet in three years Austria was again in the field, to be crushed at Wagram. The humiliating treaty of Pressburg kept Austria quiet for only four years more. The utter destruction of Prussian military power, consummated at Jena in 1807, apparently pacified Prussia until 1813, although under the surface desperate preparations were making for the recovery of national prestige. The Franco-Prussian war lacked nothing in conclusiveness, but its pacifying tendencies are to be judged in the light of forty years of competitive military preparations and the present state of Europe. On the other hand, our inconclusive war of 1812 did not stand in the way of harmonious relations with England through a century. Nor have Russia and Japan shown any inclination to renew the struggle over Manchuria so inconclusively ended in 1906.

One war may plant the seeds of another, but whether it does this depends chiefly on two circumstances: whether it leaves a taste for easy victory in the conqueror, or an abiding sense of shame in the conquered. The apparent inevitableness of victory under Napoleon made of the French a standing menace to the peace of Europe. The irresistible progress of the Germans over French soil in 1870 left in Germany a tradition of military efficiency which made out of a formerly pacific people idolators of war. On the other hand, the defeat of Austrians, Prussians, Russians by Napoleon involved those nations in disgrace as well as in loss. They had proved themselves weak, inefficient, at times cowardly. And it was the disgrace of 1870, rather than its manifest token, Alsace-Lorraine, that nourished the flame of revenge in the breasts of the French.

Recall the typical prelude to a French novel of the period after 1870. "A desolate landscape, under driving clouds. Irregular columns of men plodding, plodding, along an endless road, deep in slush and mud. Night is falling; we have been marching since dawn, without rest, without food; our knees are breaking under us. From time to time an accelerated movement from the rear: 'The Prussians are coming!' We break into a run. It is a false alarm, and we sink back into the dejected tramp, tramp, into the deepening night. Our destination? Nobody knows, but we are running away."

Running away, with nothing adequate in pursuit of them. An intolerable memory for a spirited nation, compared with which the rape of provinces and the extortion of milliards were of insignificant account. It was inevitable that the idea of revenge should tinge French thought. Revenge was essential to national self-respect—almost, one might say, to national existence. As for the actual wrongs inflicted upon France by the Germans, what were they as compared with the wrongs inflicted upon the Boers by England? But the Boers acquitted themselves like men, and hence can be loyal to the British crown.

However the present war may end, it will leave no nation gloating over easy victory. Say that Germany adds a few thousand square kilometers to her territory. A million disabled German soldiers, scattered through all the cities and villages of the Empire, will bear testimony to the costs of national aggrandizement. Say that France recovers Alsace-Lorraine. Hundreds of thousands of war widows will mingle their sighs with the jubilations of the crowd. Nor will the present war print disgrace upon the mind of any nation. All the chroniclers of the world can transmit to posterity only a tithe of the tales of heroism from any one of the warring nations. After the war the nations that have fared worst will at any rate have the consolation of the record of a gallant fight; and the nations nearest approximating the state of victors will accord generous recognition to the bravery of their foes. The formal terms of peace may leave open the door to future strife; but the underlying spirit of the peoples, something vastly more significant in the long run, is not circumscribed by written conventions. What if the coming peace shall be inconclusive? All the more probability that it will be a lasting peace.

ALVIN S. JOHNSON.

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# The Truer Germany

IN a recent article entitled "Germanity and the Germans" Professor Louis Dimier presents an unusual theory of the rise of modern Germany. He emphasizes the fact that Germany is, in its present status, a new nation, and goes on to argue that she is the only nation whose birth is due, as he terms it, to reflection. She is "a creation of philosophy." The great Germans of the eighteenth century—of the days before the Napoleonic inroads—preached the most lofty internationalism. Fichte marks the turning point in intellectual Germany between internationalism and nationalism. "One must come down to the year 1809 to see the intellectual leaders caring for [political] independence." Then began the real rise of modern Germany.

In brief this is the sum of the argument, and the article rests here without going into the underlying causes of Germany's intellectual change. Instead, by emphasizing and elaborating the indisputable fact that Germany did suffer such a change, and that she has since that date followed a course of thought which has directly led to her present extreme manifestation of nationality, a misconception of the whole spiritual issue is raised. For this emphasis, combined with Professor Dimier's silence upon any question of cause, would give the impression that Germany's intellectual change was in itself the cause of the movement rather than the effect upon intellectual men of profound human causes in the life of the people.

It is evident that this fundamental misconception of the issue exists in Professor Dimier's mind. But from an unbiased standpoint it would seem beyond the mark to claim that any people, however able, could develop a strong centralized state out of a deliberate idea. An idea must exist for the beginnings of any nation; but the prime necessity must ever be some factor affecting the whole body and life of the people, to give impetus to this idea. Sound and successful political ideas depend more upon the past than upon the future. No state ever was founded upon a fortuitous theory—constructed out of whole cloth, as it were. The sudden change in German thought from internationalism to nationalism, while open to the superficial explanation of a new movement set on foot by a few men, and presenting every outward appearance of a shift in German character, must in reality have been a natural flow from cause to effect, having its source in the deep springs of national life. All such changes taking place in a foreign nation with whose life, thought, and character we are unfamiliar have the appearance of sudden shifts and outbreaks. We see only the swift final act, but the nation itself has lived through the whole drama.

There was a day, then, when Germany held high ideals of internationalism. Her intellectual men gloried in their lack of patriotism, scorning nationalism as a narrow political evil, as a force making directly for strife and greed. The theory was borne out in practice by the German states. The German people were by nature less patriotic in the nationalistic sense of the word than the surrounding peoples; they were interested more in abstract than in concrete thought; their character had all the essentials of a broad and tolerant internationalism. Germany, strange to remember, was inefficient at that day. The German states were completely disorganized; the German lands, with the exception of Prussia, lay at the mercy of any powerful invader. The nature of the German people seemed well satisfied with this condition. Of power they were unambitious. They left the world alone; they expected the world to leave them alone.

What were the real causes of the momentous change which took place in German thought at about the beginning of the nineteenth century? A candid reading of history leads to a single disquieting conclusion: the world persistently refused to leave Germany alone. Through a period covering centuries of human history, the German lands suffered grievously at the hands of the world. Into the traditions of those lands were ground woe and misery impossible for us on this side of the water to conceive. In New England and along our old frontiers we had our scattering Indian atrocities; and they loom large in the story of our past. What would be our feelings had we at any time lost a third of our population through depredations of the Indians? Germany suffered because she was weak and her neighbors were strong, because she was idealistic and they were worldly. What was perhaps harder to bear for a proud and upright people, she met everywhere with the scorn of a world bound over into selfish nationalism. She was the butt of nations; she was laughed at for the very ideals which permitted the scorn. These are the plain facts of history; to deny their force or significance is to confess a prejudiced attitude. All things considered, it would seem that Germany held her ideals pretty long and remarkably well.

The day inevitably came when Germany began to feel that she had suffered too much. She saw that her ideals of internationalism were far ahead of their time. She saw that if she were to be left

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alone she must compel the world to leave her alone, that she must develop power if she were to continue to exist as a nation. And this was the birth of nationalism in Germany, for up to that time she had not existed as a nation. She began to realize, as well, that her lack of efficiency and power was not at all due to a corresponding lack of ability, but that with similar ideals she would prove herself even abler than her neighbors. In this sense Germany did create herself out of thought; in this strict sense the growth of modern Germany has not been a natural one. Professor Dimier's contentions are eminently true so far as they go. He fails to indicate that it was a common worldliness which Germany took up, that it was the methods of her neighbors which she began to follow, and that she did this under a fierce and sanguinary pressure which could not longer be borne.

Signs that the development of modern Germany has been forced and unnatural—that she has not been following out her native bent—are many and unmistakable. It is well claimed that Germany has originated few, if any, of the motive institutions of the nineteenth century; instead, by an unparalleled efficiency and genius for organization, she has taken over and bettered those particular ideas originated by others which seemed most necessary to her ends. This directly is the sense in which Germany became "a creation of philosophy." Many of the courses which she proposed to follow ran counter to the native disposition of her people and outraged traditional Teutonic institutions; she succeeded in changing that disposition, in remodeling those institutions. She has carried the tendencies of western civilization to their logical conclusions; she has driven the timid thought of the day to its last stand. She has done this coldly and rather cruelly, scorning the cloak of hypocrisy, and feeling no sentimental drawbacks—for they are not her own ideas. But her frankness and honesty of thought are more apparent than real; and upon her own interpretation of logical conclusions she shows as much hypocrisy as does the rest of western civilization in dodging the logical conclusions themselves.

The marvelous organization which Germany created soon became a heavy task-master of the spirit; power for defense was easily and naturally metamorphosed into power for conquest, since conquest appears to be the best means of defense; authority begot authority, the land grew rich and prosperous. Then Germany began to dream of empire. All this is an old, familiar tale. The very conduct of the present war—the creed of "necessity," the atrocious course of "frightfulness," the calm disregard of the humanities, the utter and scientific materialism—all these clearly indicate that Germany is out of her natural element. Like a strong man swinging an unfamiliar and dangerous tool she cuts herself and everyone around her, while her day's work for humanity is of questionable value. Some of her rough strokes may be in the right direction; some deep and heavy work undoubtedly needs to be done. But the result at present seems appalling, and certainly the terrific havoc will all have to be gone over again by wiser and more skilful workmen and many of the great cuts filled in.

The lesson is serious for the whole of western civilization. The German phenomenon is only another convincing proof of the evil tendencies of the present age—an age of nationalism, of individualism, of materialistic power. The case of China hangs like an ominous cloud in the eastern sky. In point of fact, China is analogous in a quite surprising degree to the Germany of a century ago. This old, great, and intrinsically strong nation, by virtue of ideals which seem peculiar to the west, and more directly on account of an insufficient and unwieldy organization, is powerless to defend itself against modern nations. Has western civilization shown it any mercy? Has it not forced its point of view and imposed its will upon China at every turn? To such a course there can be but one eventual result. China, slow to move, will move at last; those who have heretofore claimed that it is beyond her ability to move have now to take into account a new pressure put upon her by the west—a pressure exerted by proxy, as it were, through a kindred people, the Japanese. Threatened by her successful neighbor, China will move more quickly now. She will take up western methods with all that they entail. How far she may carry them no one can foresee. With such a land and such a people, the possible reaction upon western civilization itself may well give us pause.

If from this war Germany must learn to be less autocratic, the whole west must learn to be less greedy. With this candid thought in mind, the possibility of a drawn campaign does not hold the dangerous elements which it presents to the partisan. An absolute defeat on the one hand means an absolute victory on the other; and history proves that nothing is more potentially dangerous than an absolute victory, except in cases of civil war. Where the victor would be equally at fault with the vanquished respecting the fundamental issues of the war, such a victory could easily become disastrous to humanity at large.

Who the better workmen of the future are to be is hard to tell. Germany herself has them within her borders, if they could once more handle the tools. Germany's native bent lies in the direction of social betterment, of industrial control, of com-

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munistic government, of intensive agriculture, of all those local projects in which she has of late years been so heartily and pre-eminently successful. Towards these the old strain of internationalism in the German character directly contributes. Strange as it may sound in the face of the present situation, Germany's mission, if she is to have a mission, must be to teach nations how to leave each other alone and how to govern themselves at home. The germs of the world's best democracy lie latent in Germany—the germs of a democracy such as the world has not yet seen. The way of its appearing rests on the knees of the gods. But as for crushing German militarism, that is work for the German people alone. Let Germany crush her own militarism—and then it will be crushed. By any conceivable pressure from without it would only be strengthened. Such talk is the talk of authority, of another militarism. If there is ever to be a sound peace, faith in the true Germany must be the chief article of the terms.

LINCOLN COLCORD.

# Can Germany Win?

AT the approach of the first anniversary of the war there is one question in the mind of everyone. For the first twelve months it is patent that the victories, conquests, successes, have been almost entirely German. Peace to-day on the existing basis would give the Kaiser enormous gains in population, territory and influence. But since peace is unthinkable and German success has not yet been in any sense decisive, the great problem remains: Can Germany win?

Americans, too closely confined to war news of Allied origin, will almost invariably answer in the negative. High finance has already accepted the ultimate defeat of Germany, and the Allied capitals and public remain entirely confident of German defeat, while recognizing that the end of the struggle is afar off. Yet the fact remains that the Germans expect to win. The expectation is revealed in their press, their statesmanship, but above all in their military operations. Patently the new operation just breaking out in Poland is something more than a mere offensive-defensive. It is a bid for decision against Russia that bears every evidence of the completeness and magnitude of the effort that marked the opening days of the war.

It is clear that German expectation of victory is based primarily upon the belief that in the next few months Russia can be eliminated from the battle lines, that defeat and the collapse of Russian armies and munitioning resources will compel the Czar to make peace on German terms, but terms which it is easy to believe will not be too onerous in view of the continental situation.

The basis of German calculation seems to be this: England has failed to get up as a decisive factor in the west. France, despite her magnificent efforts, has been beaten in Champagne, in the St. Mihiel district, and in Artois. Her small gains in these regions have been attained at huge losses, and the failure of the English to come to her assistance, particularly in the recent struggle north of Arras, has prevented any successful penetration of the German lines in the west. Confessions of British statesmen, the muddle over munitions, the palpable disorder in the British industrial system as evidenced by the new coal strike, combine to convince Germany that she need fear no grave peril from Britain in the present summer, and that she can depend upon her forces now in the west to hold, while her eastern campaign is pressed to a decision.

In the same fashion the resistance of the Turks at the Dardanelles gives promise of preventing the arrival in Russia of large quantities of munitions for the next few decisive weeks. Constantinople may fall ultimately, but if Russia can be crushed first the fall will be without real meaning. In the same estimate goes the expectation that Rumanian neutrality will hold for the period that Germany feels she needs to win. Austrian and German masses have been pushed down along the Rumanian frontier; there can be no junction between Russian and Rumanian forces at the moment. The victories over the Russians in Galicia have had a tremendous moral effect in Bucarest, not sufficient to keep the Latin state neutral permanently, perhaps, but enough to warn her to await the verdict in Poland.

As for Italy, her advance is steady but slow. It must be months at the present rate before she can send her masses toward Vienna. The fortresses of the Trentino and the Carnic and Julian Alps may be depended upon to hold back her main effort, while the great struggle is being waged about Warsaw. If this struggle turns out to be a German victory, local advances of the Italians, the capture of fortified positions and towns, will be of little permanent advantage when the German masses are sent south, after Russia has been disposed of permanently.

Of her ability to dispose of Russia Germany is absolutely certain, and her recent triumphs in

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Galicia and her great victories in other campaigns supply adequate reason for a confidence even greater than that of the German. He expects to take Warsaw in the next few weeks, to throw the Russians back from the Vistula to the Bug. He is sending columns north along the coast, apparently aiming now at Riga. But they may be moved on toward Petrograd. Remember that no Napoleonic problem is here, because Germany has absolute control of the Baltic, and her army can be munitioned and provisioned from Libau or later from Riga.

History counts for much in the German mind, and every German recalls that a change in alignment of Russia at the critical moment in the history of Frederick the Great saved the Prussian king from a ruin that seemed ineluctable. It was the change of Russia in the Napoleonic combat that ruined Napoleon. Now the German expects first to defeat the Russian decisively, thus demonstrating how useless are his allies. He hopes by such a defeat to persuade the Russians to give up the struggle, to retire, having borne the brunt of the world war and having been, as the German alleges, left to go down in disaster by their allies.

It is not Russian territory that the Germans desire. Therefore Berlin will make terms which may go no further than to require Russia to disinterest herself with the fate of the Balkan states. It is toward Constantinople and the Near East that the Germans and Austrians are looking. German imperial visions follow the Bagdad railway toward the Euphrates and India. Once Russia is out of the way, the fate of Servia is sealed, and the Teutonic empires can hope to descend the Vardar to Salonica and the Aegean to Valona.

As for their other opponents, the Germans are satisfied that the French can do no more than they have done. They believe that if Russia is disposed of, France will soon abandon a hopeless struggle in which she bears the losses while Great Britain stands paralyzed by internal disorder and military ineptitude. Again, Germany has little to ask of France save an indemnity and perhaps the Channel ports. She means to keep Belgium, she is holding it now against France and England while she makes her great bid for a decision in the east. If she wins this, what possible hope can there be for France and England to clear Belgium when the victorious German hosts have turned again west?

As for Italy, it is difficult to understand the extent of German contempt for Italian military power. Once the eastern troubles are settled, Austria, with German advice and direction, may be depended upon in the German view to return to the valley of the Po, beat down the Italian resistance and force a humiliating peace which will leave Italy at the mercy of the central powers. As peace may be made easy for Russia and France, it will certainly be made hard for Italy, and all Italian dreams of reoccupying the Venetian place in the Near East will be destroyed for all time.

There remains England, but in her present calculations Germany is postponing "the day." She is satisfied that if she can dispose of the continental powers and by indemnities refill her purse, she can take up the Napoleonic struggle with a certainty of success, given her own perfect industrial organization and the British national collapse, which the Germans accept as complete and likely to endure.

Germany, then, answers the great interrogation with a confident affirmative. Germans expect to win. They build their hopes mainly upon the success they look forward to in the next few months in disposing of Russia. This is precisely the faith that they displayed where France was concerned a year ago. The road to victory lies through Warsaw, but it is enough for Germans to know that Hinderburg and Mackensen are already well along on this road.

How far is this faith fantastic? Certainly not as far as it now seems to most of us in America. Given an overwhelming triumph in the east, which puts Russia out of the running for months, if not for all, it is not impossible to believe that all else that the Germans expect may happen. Surely France will not stop short of exhaustion, but that exhaustion cannot be more than a year off, unless England shows new speed in getting her forces up. If Russia is eliminated it is hardly too much to believe that the effort to free Belgium will be well nigh hopeless. The opening of the road for reinforcements from Vienna to Stamboul will not long wait upon Russian defeat, and unless the city falls before this success, the Dardanelles campaign will come to an ignominious end, and France and England will need every man in the west.

The whole problem comes down to one of personal judgment. I am very far from believing that the German success in the east will measure up to German expectations or that Russia will even temporarily be eliminated. As for a permanent Russian withdrawal, a separate peace, this seems incredible. But what it is necessary to recognize at the moment is that the Germans expect to win the war, that they have sound reasons for expecting such a result, and that since the days of the Marne there has never been a time when they could with equal reason anticipate a complete victory. Conversely, if their great effort in Russia fails, as did that at the Marne, then there is no escaping the conclusion that the beginning of the end will be in sight. Germany is making her supreme bid for success. Measured by the cost of the war to her in men and money so far, measured by the prospects of her

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enemies in the future, it seems impossible that she can again seek decision if she fails now.

But this week, on the first anniversary of the war, we must remember that Germany once again has the chance to achieve a decision. German confidence of an ultimate victory is not foolish, it is not lacking in sound basis. It is not more warranted than the confidence that preceded the defeat at the Marne, but it is almost as well founded. In fact, the second great crisis, perhaps the final crisis of the conflict, seems at hand.

FRANK H. SIMONDS.

# CORRESPONDENCE

## To Make War Unthinkable

SIR: If it is not too late I should like to comment on your editorial of July third, entitled "The Deeper Preparedness."

You say: "Both pacifists and militarists—to use inaccurate but convenient words—proclaim their interest in peace. It remains for the public to require both of them to explain the foreign policy they have in mind before they proceed to adopt means of carrying it out."

Speaking as a pacifist, I reply that with every surface appearance of common sense you are "putting the cart before the horse." Beyond advocating what is an inherent and inevitable part of the pacifist platform, i.e., a non-aggressive national policy, it is not necessary for the peace movement to concern itself in the first instance with questions of international policy. National disputes will arise —they are unavoidable—so long as separate nations exist. Our concern is with the method of settling those disputes. Our function is to establish new values, to create an overpowering sense of the sacredness of life, so that war will be unthinkable; so that when international disputes arise, even of the most grave character—when lives have been lost, when our rights have been clearly invaded—we shall not turn to wholesale, deliberate destruction of life as the means of settling those disputes, of avenging those deaths, of asserting those rights.

Our function, again, is to devise the substitute, or substitutes for war—to start the political genius of the world thinking, inventing, along this line. We did not wait for the last word on individual rights before establishing courts to adjudicate them. Quarreling persists among men, but duelling has been abolished. Pacifist agitation is directed primarily, and rightly, I think, against the prevailing archaic and barbarous *method* of determining international disputes. No amount of wisdom and forbearance and generosity will prevent disputes arising. The flag will be insulted here and there, boundary questions will come up, trade disputes will arise, American lives will be lost, the national honor will be offended, no doubt to the end of time, or for centuries to come; let us be "prepared" for those contingencies by all means, but prepared to meet them in a civilized, grown-up way, not by the flourish of the big stick, and the slaughter of thousands. That is the pacifist's concern.

Finally, the peace movement is essentially international in character. No world court or international federation can be established unless there is a strong desire for it in many nations. Therefore the pacifist agitation cannot concern itself too closely with questions of purely national policy. Beyond insisting that each nation should be non-aggressive, beyond insisting that national integrity be preserved, and such trade freedom and possibility for expansion be allowed each nation as are necessary to its successful national existence, and asserting his willingness to have these matters left to an international body in which each nation has just representation, the pacifist, it seems to me, need not concern himself with national policies.

Especially is it important that in the present controversy he should not lose himself in the necessarily involved discussions of national policy. The immediate function of the pacifist in America to-day is to fight the agitation for increased armament as a step in the wrong direction, as a long backward step away from the achievement of his ideals. We are not in any immediate danger of invasion, probably not for ten years. During that time we have the opportunity to inaugurate some sort of world understanding which shall remove once and for all the danger of such invasion and the necessity of providing against it. If now we take the fatal step of large increase in armament, inevitably we shall arouse suspicion and unfriendliness, no nation will believe us when we talk of a democratic world federation or a league of peace; we shall have lost the opportunity of centuries. That is the pacifist's "ideal" reason for opposing the advocates of "preparedness," so-called. His "practical" reason is that a big increase in armament on the part of an important neutral nation at a critical time like this, is most obviously playing with fire—it is inviting war upon us.

CRYSTAL EASTMAN BENEDICT.

New York City.

[NOTE—An editorial answering Mrs. Benedict's letter will be found on page 299 of this number under the title "The Deeper Preparedness."]

## American Finance in Canada

SIR: Your article on "The Case of Canada" is of more than passing interest, and no one will quarrel with your thesis that America should cultivate the good will of Canada. But are you altogether correct in assuming that America is comparatively indifferent to Canada? Since the war began Canada has been obliged to turn to us almost entirely for her current financial needs. London has been unable to continue her loans, and early in the war told Canada that such would be the case. The consequence is that in the first six months of this year American investors have loaned to Canada upwards of seventy millions of dollars. These loans have been to provinces and municipalities, across all Canada from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In promptly responding to this demand for financial assistance, sentiment as well as business has been a factor with American investors and banking houses.

You also assume, incorrectly, that Canada's present hard

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times are due to the war. You must have overlooked the fact that for the two years prior to the war Canada had been having a hard time of it. She has been suffering severely from over-extension. She has been trying to go ahead far too rapidly. In the last five years Canada has built through to the Pacific coast two new railways. When we stop to think of the decades which it took the United States to build and support its transcontinental railways we can begin to perceive some of the causes for Canada's financial plight. In order to carry through these railway projects Canada has been obliged to invoke the aid of the state to an almost appalling degree. There is hardly one of her provinces that is not heavily liable in the guaranty of railway bonds. So serious has that situation become that now there is serious talk of the Dominion taking over bodily and operating two of the great railway systems. To Americans this over-expansion is not novel. We can all remember boom times in the West a generation or more ago and the bad collapses which many of our western cities and regions suffered. Now we have worked well out of that sort of thing, but it is not surprising that Canada has stubbed her toe in the same way.

By all means let us, as you are wise enough to urge, cultivate Canada and the Canadians. But let us do it on correct assumptions, and not with the idea first that Canada's financial distress comes from the war or that we are as yet turning a deaf ear to her requests. Neither of these ideas is correct.

RECIPROCITY.

New York City.

[If "Reciprocity" will read again carefully the article entitled "The Case of Canada," he will see that THE NEW REPUBLIC did not make the mistakes imputed. We distinctly implied that the economic crisis antedated the war, and that the war merely interrupted the normal process of recuperation. We were also well aware that Canada was receiving from this country financial assistance which she could normally obtain from London. It was the indifference of American public opinion about which we complained, not that of American financial interests.—THE EDITORS.]

## Research for the Public

SIR: While we are grateful that the Industrial Fellowship System of the Mellon Institute came through the editorial pages of THE NEW REPUBLIC with only one flaw, we are "pernickety" enough to attempt to explain away that one flaw: "That whatever discoveries are made become the immediate patented private property of the manufacturer."

The Mellon Institute was founded and privately endowed for one purpose—to show what science, when properly applied, can do for industry in this country. All other features of the Institute have been made subservient to this one. If the Institute achieves its purpose, it will have mattered little to whom the immediate results of discoveries went. The one flaw is not as bad as THE NEW REPUBLIC would make it appear. In each agreement for a fellowship there is a clause which provides for the publication of the results for the benefit of the public at the expiration of three years from the time of the termination of the agreement, provided that publicity at that time does not unduly injure the interest of the donating company.

We are at a loss to suggest a more practical scheme of having discoveries placed on a working basis than under our method. Our present industrial system permits of no more efficient scheme of giving results to the public than through an industrial concern. If the editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC knew what a task it was to induce an American industrialist to invest in research, we feel that they would be tempted to offer the industrialist not only a monopoly on the discovery, but also a bonus for placing the discovery on a working basis. While THE NEW REPUBLIC is agitating for the socialization of industries, the Mellon Institute is attempting to contribute its share toward bringing it to pass through placing present industries on a foundation of merit.

JOHN O'CONNOR, JR.

Philadelphia, Pa.
Mellon Institute of Industrial Research.

## Protocol Aided Public Health

SIR: In the destruction of the protocol, the Department of Health suffered the loss of a competitor—or, to be more accurate, of an ally—whose disappearance I regard as a calamity.

The Joint Board of Sanitary Control was organized in 1910 in accordance with one of the provisions of the protocol that had been signed by the Manufacturers' Protective Association and the Joint Board of the Cloak and Suit-Makers' Union. Its declared purpose was the establishment of sanitary standards in the industry; such standards the manufacturers and the unions "obligated themselves to maintain, to the best of their ability and to the full extent of their power." The effectiveness of its work has been universally recognized and commended, and the program of the Joint Board is to-day the official program of the Department of Health for the sanitary regulation of industry generally.

The need of sanitary industrial regulation is obvious. Regulation by compulsion, however, is not and never can be wholly satisfactory. There is safety in self-respect, and an industry which undertakes to maintain by its own efforts proper sanitary standards, not only protects itself but is an aid to society. For these reasons the Department of Health is endeavoring to arouse a livelier interest in and a better understanding of sanitary matters in various industries. Our two strongest arguments are these: first, that sanitary standards are desirable; and second, that the maintenance of sanitary conditions is practicable through voluntary effort, in proof of which heretofore it has been necessary only to point to the actual record of the Joint Board of Sanitary Control. The discontinuance of that body is a grave loss to the public-health movement.

S. S. GOLDWATER, M.D.

New York City.

## Christianity After the War

SIR: The world has not tired of Jesus Christ. It thinks more about him than it has ever done before. It honors him, believes in him, and wants to follow him. Men who look into their own lives and hearts (and such men ultimately lead their fellow men), men who are intelligent enough to observe the course of the world in which they live, feel that these times need him as truly as have any times needed him since he was a baby born. So much is sure.

Another thing seems equally sure. It is this: that Christianity as it has been proclaimed by the orthodox churches can no longer hope to win a world-wide influence. It has lost what it claimed to possess, the power to uplift and guide the nations, to draw men to each other, to

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base human life on human brotherhood. Confronted with national hatreds and jealousies, it has utterly broken down. The great national churches have played an insignificant and unworthy part in the vast drama now unfolding. These churches have either perverted what Jesus taught, or they have placed false emphasis on his teaching. They have insisted on things he cared little for, or knew nothing about, such as creeds, sacraments and dogmas, and they have eagerly striven for things he distinctly refused to have anything to do with, political position and social power. They have not insisted as he did, that to love God, and when we fail to do that, then to do the next thing to it, viz., love men, is the one real, possible, saving, immediate duty of all who would be his disciples.

The religious world we have known can never be the same world again. The sort of Christianity we were generally taught as boys can never be taught again. Men will have a real Jesus, an actual leader and teacher, or if he is made impossible to them, they will find some other race leader, for we are all incurably religious. The churches have, with the best intentions, disguised their Lord. Some of the disguises they have clothed him in are beautiful and reverable, but even the beautiful ones must finally go to the rag-bin. Multitudes feel that the real Jesus, when he is presented to men, still draws all that is best in the human heart to himself—still has power, as has no other, to save men from their sins. But of ecclesiasticism our age is sick. It has disguised and distorted the master of men. Its doom is the rubbish heap, to which Jesus condemned it long ago.

W. S. Rainsford.

New York City.

## The Rodman Case

SIR: The article referring to the suspension of Henrietta Rodman in your issue of June twenty-sixth seems to me so unfair that I would like to call the writer's attention to the enclosed statement which I published at the time:

> I am afraid some of our teachers may misunderstand the motives which actuated the Board of Education in suspending Henrietta Rodman. I wish that we could let them know that, without the slightest disposition to suppress free speech or to discourage independence or initiative, and without the least thought of personal resentment on account of her ridicule of its members, the action of the Board has been dictated entirely by its judgment of the interest of the schools.
>
> In our entire school system, and indeed in our entire system of democratic government, nothing is more vital than loyalty. The whole organization is built upon loyal cooperation and respectful obedience to constituted authority. If this foundation is undermined the whole structure is threatened. Moreover, in educatting our children for citizenship nothing is more important than that the quality of loyalty should be inculcated by example as well as by precept.
>
> A teacher in our public schools occupies a position of responsibility and influence from which she cannot escape when she leaves the classroom. She speaks not alone as an individual but in her official capacity as well. Her words carry weight and influence with other teachers and pupils which would not attach to them otherwise. Free expression of opinion in moderate and reasonable tone is wholesome and helpful, but the use of the position and influence which the Board has conferred upon her, to undermine the respect and loyalty due to lawfully constituted authority, is a form of treason which cannot be ignored or condoned.
>
> This principle is recognized in every department of government. An official of the army or navy, or of any branch of civil service, who should make use of his position to ridicule his superiors and undermine their influence and authority, would hardly escape with a suspension. Loyalty is demanded in governmental affairs and in business affairs as an imperative requirement, because of the general conviction that a disloyal employee, like a wheel out of gear, is an obstacle rather than a help in any organization. On this theory the Board would have been quite justified in dismissing Henrietta Rodman from the service. In merely suspending her until next September they have treated her very leniently, but this punishment will be of little value unless it shall serve to impress upon her and upon our teachers throughout the school system the importance which the Board attaches to a spirit of loyalty.

William G. Willcox.

West New Brighton, N.Y.

## The Logic of Exporting Arms

SIR: I have read with considerable interest the article on "Why America Exports Arms" published in the recent issue of your journal. Your final conclusion seems to me sound, but I feel that your logic, concerning the neutrality of our government were an embargo placed on the export of arms, is faulty. You say, "If it is neutral to sell military supplies to both belligerents when only one can secure the delivery of its purchases, it would be equally neutral to refuse to sell to either belligerent."

Your logic would be strictly correct had a policy of non-intercourse in munitions been declared before either side made any purchases in this country. Ammunition is only one form of contraband. The raw material for the manufacture of war supplies belongs in the same class. Had such a policy been established then, no one could call it a violation of neutrality, but to sell freely all kinds of contraband to both belligerents even after the war broke out, and to ship contraband to Germany and her allies until the command of the seas is wrested from her, and then to place an embargo on the sale of munitions of war, it seems to me would involve an absolute breach of neutrality. The time to change the rules of the game is before it begins and not after one side has secured an advantage under the rules. The combined navies of the Allies have established their supremacy, and to deprive them of the advantages thus secured is most assuredly a violation of neutrality.

C. M. Jansky.

Madison, Wis.

[If the American government was legally entitled to forbid the export of munitions of war to all the belligerents on August 1, 1914, we have the same legal right one year later. Assuming that we were engaged in serious military operations in Mexico it might be necessary to do so. Lacking such a positive need, it would be unfriendly to declare an embargo but not un-neutral. Neutrality hangs upon the observance of the rule of treating all belligerents alike, not upon the effect of doing so. We are neutral now because both belligerents can buy in this country, although only one can secure delivery. We would still be neutral in case neither could buy in this country.—The Editors.]

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# The German Socialists

*The Socialists and the War. A Documentary Statement of the Position of the Socialists of all Countries, with Special Reference to their Peace Policy. Edited by William English Walling. New York: Henry Holt & Company. $1.50.*

PROFESSOR WARD has somewhere drawn the distinction between primitive ethics and the new ethics. Primitive ethics is merely race morality. It has nothing to do with the happiness or unhappiness of the world, but is merely the custom of the group. It is obedience to group sentiment and to the need of race safety. It is ingrained and deeply rutted. In periods of great peril, as when wars shake the foundations of reason, the newer ethics loses its hold upon the masses of men, and the primitive ethics, which is not dead but merely overlaid, reasserts its sway.

In the present war we find innumerable instances of this reassertion of primitive ethics. As we study the excellent collection of documents assembled by Mr. Walling we note how the various socialist parties, which represented the new ethics, were drawn one after the other into a frenzied nationalism. This spiritual decline seems the most startling in the case of the German Socialists, for the majority of Americans believe that the Germans were fighting a war of aggression, planned long in advance, for the greater glory of *le Roi de Prusse*. They cannot understand how the Socialists could have abetted so evil and reactionary an enterprise. The German Social Democratic party was easily the largest and most influential socialist organization in the world. It preached internationalism and peace. It was unalterably opposed to autocracy, militarism and conquest. As late as July 25, 1914, this party declared that Austria's note to Serbia was "intended deliberately to provoke war," and it promised that "not one drop of a German soldier's blood shall be sacrificed to the lust of power of the Austrian rulers." Day after day during the negotiations leading up to the war, the Berlin Socialist paper *Vorwärts* attacked the German "camarilla of war-lords" who were seeking to "devastate Europe." And yet on August fourth the German Social Democratic party voted the war budget. After washing its hands of all responsibility, it declared that "we give our sanction to the voting of those moneys demanded."

This astounding declaration of the German Social Democratic party must be recognized as one of the most significant facts of modern history. It was a complete surrender of the principles of a great democratic party. It revealed political cowardice and that moral weakness which often accompanies electoral growth. It seemed like the end of an era. But as we study the documents which Mr. Walling presents, we begin to understand some of the causes and limitations of this *volte face* of the German Socialists. From these documents it appears how completely the German Socialists shared the general German opinion that the war was a purely defensive war against Russia. Nor were the Socialists a unit. Mr. Walling quotes a letter from Karl Liebknecht who protests that the vote did not represent the unanimous sentiment of the Socialist representatives, but that within the party caucus "opposing views found expression with a violence hitherto unknown in our deliberations."

It cannot be denied that in July, 1914, the masses of the German workers were attacked by a patriotic fervor which swept aside all the cautions and inhibitions of fifty years of Socialist propaganda. As soon as he became convinced that the Czar, deaf to the Kaiser's entreaties, was about to launch his Cossacks against a peaceful nation, the German Socialist recognized that he was a German first and Socialist only second, and when the report was spread that the Russians were actually over the frontier, he, like his fellow citizens, was attacked by a violent war fever. But fevers, because of their very violence, do not last. The temperature falls, the pulse slackens, and the ordinary conditions of health return.

In Germany we may note to-day the beginnings of a saner attitude towards the war on the part of the German Socialists. The war has proved to be longer and more burdensome than had been anticipated, and the invasion of Belgium has not appeared to all Socialists as a proper defense against Russian aggression. It is difficult during a war to trace or even to express such a change in opinion. Mr. Walling, however, has succeeded in presenting a large number of significant newspaper editorials, news items, interviews, proclamations and other material showing how even under the heavy weight of the censorship certain approaches are being made to a new attitude on the part of the Socialists. Men like Kautsky, while defending the participation of the German Socialists in the war, also defend the participation of Socialists in the countries opposed to Germany. Papers like *Vorwärts,* the *Volkszeitung* of Leipsic, the *Buergerzeitung* of Bremen, have adopted a distinctly detached attitude towards the war. *Vorwärts* did not justify the vote of the Socialist party and, without definitely saying so, strongly disapproved of the invasion of Belgium. It upheld the labor parties of Belgium and France in their defense of their countries, and suggested its belief that the German government was responsible for the bringing on of the conflict. When on December 2, 1914, the party voted for the second war loan, it hinted at its opposition to the government's attitude towards Belgium and vaguely suggested its hope of an early peace. But the really significant fact of this debate was that one man, Karl Liebknecht, ventured, in defiance of his own party, to proclaim in the Reichstag that the war "is a preventive war provoked conjointly by the war-parties of Germany and Austria in the obscurity of semi-absolutism and secret diplomacy."

So far as one can judge, there is a slow and steady movement within the German social democracy away from the position taken by the party on August fourth, when in the fear of a Russian aggression they were stampeded into an affirmative vote on the war budget. On December 2. 1914, fourteen Socialist representatives, rather than side with the majority of their party, absented themselves from the Reichstag, while on March 20, 1915, when the third war loan was before the House, thirty party members, including Bernstein, Haase and other leaders, abstained from voting, and two members voted no. Mr. Walling believes that not less than a million Socialist voters are more or less opposed to the governmental war policy, and that a still larger number would be opposed to the war if it were once recognized as a war of conquest.

The events of the last few days, as they have appeared in fragmentary form in the newspapers, confirm the general impression of Mr. Walling's book, that the German Socialists are gradually returning to the position which they held before the war. The opposition to a policy of conquest is becoming stronger, and the demand for a speedy conclusion of an honorable peace grows insistent. The German Socialists are becoming less convinced of the imminence of the Russian menace, and more sensitive to the criticism of England and France and especially of the Socialists of those countries. To-day, as a year ago, German Socialists are determined to prevent a spoliation

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of Germany, but they now appear to suspect at least that the official German theory of the war is not above suspicion. While it is impossible to predict how far or in what direction this change of sentiment will act, it can hardly be doubted that a new situation is created in Europe by the slow return of German Socialists to their ante-bellum attitude. W. E. W.

# The Dynastic State

*The Dynastic State, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution, by Thorstein Veblen. New York: The Macmillan Co.. $1.50 net.*

PROFESSOR VEBLEN has written a book miles and miles above the level of the sea. It is an analysis of the origins and nature of imperial Germany beginning with neolithic times and ending with the day before yesterday. Veblen views all the world and all history, recorded and unrecorded, from a vantage ground so elevated that the great nations upon which he looks, struggling and sweating in the dust, seem like minute animalculae under a powerful microscope. He does not descend to moral judgments. He abjures all advocacy. He is detached—infinitely detached. Or, to use an over-popular German phrase, which I am sure Professor Veblen with his taste for verbal delicacies would roll under his tongue, the book is *streng objektiv.*

It is only as we read further that we discover in this cool, artificially dry atmosphere of Professor Veblen the concealed signs of a laughing spirit. It is not humor, if we accept Thackeray's definition of it as "a mixture of love and wit," for whatever Professor Veblen's love for the things he is considering it is admirably disguised. It is rather a sense of the vanity and subjectivity of our contemporary judgments that Professor Veblen by means of a mock-pedantry and a forced emotional detachment manages to suggest. Mr. Veblen is the most artful of all dissemblers in speech, the most skilfully back-handed of all players with words. You must be on your guard to distinguish between what he seems to say and what he really means.

But to return to imperial Germany. Professor Veblen "aims to account for Germany's industrial advance and high efficiency by natural causes, without drawing on the logic of manifest destiny, Providential nepotism, national genius and the like." He traces this efficiency to the fact that imperial Germany has been able to take over the fruits of the industrial revolution, without paying the heavy costs of the pioneer and the experimenter, and that her mediaeval conception of the state has been an added benefit to her. England, the classic land of the industrial revolution, is still hampered by all the material and moral wastes incurred in the transition to the machine era. She built up her industries, her commerce, her railways in the beginning. As a consequence her present progress is halted at every turn by her low railway bridges, her absurd little engines, her comparatively small industrial units, her unmodern methods of business and her ingrained industrial conservatism. What was an advantage became a drawback. *Wohlthat wird Plage.* Her slums are recruited from men and women who as children were overworked and under-educated, or who were crushed by a national attitude of ruthless individualism. Germany on the other hand fused her conception of a dynastic state with that of the new technology. She carried over a detailed, paternalistic administration and "a popular habit of mind suitable to a coercive, centralized and irresponsible control," and applied this intricate system to the guidance and subordination to dynastic purposes of a rapidly developing industry. She also suffered from waste. Her standing army was expensive, though perhaps not more costly than was the unrestrained pleasure-seeking of a more individualistic society. Her protective tariff cramped her industrial development, though it strengthened the dynasty and made the nation self-supporting in times of war. In short, Germany succeeded in making rapid industrial and therefore military progress by applying the coercion, the loyalty and the submissiveness of a dynastic state to a ready-made industrial system, imported from Britain.

The question remains, will this fusion endure? Will Germany be able to impose her mediaeval-ultra-modern system upon the world, or failing this, will she be able to maintain it for herself? To both of these questions Professor Veblen replies in the negative. The elements of this combination are out of touch with the habits of thought of communities of a maturer culture, like the French and the English, and the combination itself is clearly unstable and transitory. Combining a "traditional *penchant* for Romantic metaphysics and feudalistic loyalty" with a headlong application of mechanistic science, the German culture lacks homogeneity and equilibrium. It is doomed to dissolution as the mental habits associated with industrialism come into conflict with those earlier habits resulting from fifteen hundred years of political subservience and loyalty. In the long run the dynastic state cannot live with the machine industry and cannot live without it.

Professor Veblen believes that the Prussian imperial system is the main embodiment of reaction against the current of modern civilization, and he interprets the present European struggle as a "warlike-dynastic diversion" in which the imperial state has been the protagonist. He does not admit, however, that the cultural losses from the war will be as great as is commonly believed. The destruction of property is serious, but unless the war lasts very long, those industrial arts and habits which form the immaterial economic equipment of the nations will be preserved, and the mere loss in material goods speedily repaired. Moreover, both during and after the war there will be a vast decrease in the waste of "conventional" expenditure. Even the tremendous loss of life will be in some measure compensated, since to a certain extent at least there will be a self-selection for slaughter of men whose temperamental bent fits them for a military rather than an industrial career. "It should be noted," he concludes, "that officers commonly are gentlemen, in the several senses which that word conveys, and gentlemen commonly have no industrial value."

In the end we lay down Professor Veblen's book with a certain sense of frustration. The theory he advances is large and original, but the very detachment of the author baffles us, and the ironic and elusive treatment of a subject matter which lends itself to a more direct handling, gives us a feeling that Veblen has said only a few of the things that were in his mind. Even though the German system is unstable and transient, does it not contain valuable permanent elements, that must be absorbed by the other nations with which Germany competes? Is this German efficiency based chiefly on dynastic tradition or is it due in great measure to a new discipline imposed by large-scale industry? We feel as though Professor Veblen had made out his case rather than answered our questions, and we wish that he would write a new volume beginning where this one ends. After all, that wish may be the highest possible recommendation of the book.

WALTER E. WEYL.

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# A French Glimpse at America

*America and her Problems, by Paul H. B. d'Estournelles de Constant. New York: The Macmillan Company. $2.00.*

IN 1911 and 1912 an amiable French baron with a penchant for saying nothing except good concerning the living, traveled many hundred miles about this country of ours, and produced for the mutual enlightenment of his own country and ourselves a book which comes to us as "the fruit of a lifetime of observation." It is, however, more than fruit, it is an orchard lavishly strewn with plums of the most delicious description. We used to believe that the Englishman had a greater talent for fatuity than any other kind of human being, but the Baron has convinced me that if you only give a Frenchman the chance he will cheerfully stagger you. I like particularly the paragraph headed "A Few Words on American Literature, Science and Philosophy." It runs:

> "Perhaps I ought to stop now for a moment and say at least a few words of American literature, science and philosophy. The American writer is interested in anything that is life—scientific, social, economic, material and moral progress, actual politics or history; he uses the latest refinements or discoveries to ascertain facts and illustrate his observations; he tries, at any price, to reach the attention of his readers, all more or less very busy, but still disposed to learn, and to read and to propagate good books. Excellent books of education are daily published in all the great centers of the United States. Books are respected as guides. American printing and binding can too easily compete with our actual French ways. I read almost every day in the newspapers, magazines or reviews, excellent articles which are not generally elaborated with so much care as ours, but are deep, interesting and genuine. But I must pursue my journey."

Does not priceless criticism like this make you hunger for a healthy race of illiterates? Still if the Baron had been illiterate we should have missed the three pages on "The American Barber" which immediately follows the "few words." The incident in the Blackstone Hotel is an almost lyric interpretation of one of America's most urgent problems. She is the manicure girl.

> "While I was lying almost at full length and being operated upon, I kept one eye open so as to watch her. She was fair, refined and distinguished in appearance. She looked like the typical typewriter girl who ends by making a rich marriage. She sat beside a chair on which a young man of about thirty was reclining. Between her two white palms she held a hand he had abandoned to her ministrations. She opened and closed it, manipulated it and might almost be said to have made a plaything of it, but, as a matter of fact, she was not doing it for amusement, and was working the hand just as if she were modeling in wax. And what was the young man doing or saying while this angelic being leaned over him with his hand in hers? He was calmly holding his newspaper in the other hand and reading steadily."
>
> "Here is something we shall never see in France, I thought. In America it is perfectly natural, and it explains many things. Sensuality is reduced to the minimum in the United States. It is put to one side, and at first no one has time to think about it; later on, its danger in a new country is realized. The joint education of the sexes has thus become possible. Girls can do anything, and they finally exteriorize themselves and satisfy part of their natural instincts by devoting themselves to various forms of work, social activity or physical exercise, and by degrees the calls of nature become less frequent and less imperative. I do not know whether this can be described as happiness or as virtue, but it is a fact, and this fact plays a very important part in the life of the United States."

The Baron's tour seems to have been supervised by interpreters of American life no less profound than Nicholas Murray Butler and Andrew Carnegie. He seems to have devoted himself to a large number of admirable luncheons, and met in every city rich and benevolent gentlemen. He made many speeches. The honor that was done to him was done, as it were, to France. He met many college presidents and touched "the idealistic movement." But when I think that the Baron was distributed through this country as a symbol of France, and that his book will pass about both here and abroad as an interpretation of America, I begin to despair of nations ever getting outside their spiritual skin.

There is, however, much in him that is heartening for us who are interested in Europe. The American need no longer be modest about recording his cheerful and inaccurate impressions. Of course we do it a little differently. We would be apt to call our own amiable, light-fingered and moronic observations by some such title as "Skirting About France," or "Snapshots at Europe." To distribute them through five hundred pages and then call the book "France and her Problems" would be a masterpiece of the classic French irony that we are scarcely capable of.

R. S. B.

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